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Much of the law of free speech is based on
half-truths. These are principles or understandings
that have a good deal to offer, that have fully
plausible origins in history and principle, and that
have mostly salutary consequences. But they also
have significant blind spots. The blind spots distort
important issues and in the end disserve the system
of free expression.
In this essay, I deal with the four most
important of these half-truths. (1) The First
Amendment prohibits all viewpoint discrimination.
(2) The most serious threat to the system of free
expression consists of government regulation of
speech on the basis of content. (3) Government may
'subsidize" speech on whatever terms it chooses. (4)
Content-based restrictions on speech are always
worse than content-neutral restrictions on speech.
Taken together, these half-truths explain a
surprisingly large amount of free speech law. All in
all, they may do more good than harm. But they also
obscure inquiry and at times lead to inadequate
outcomes.
The four half-truths are closely related, and
it will probably be beneficial to understand their
many interactions. Above all, I suggest that the
doctrinal distinctions embodied in the half-truths are
taking on an unfortunate life of their own; it is as if
the doctrines are operating for their own sake. In
some ways, the distinctions are threatening to lose
touch with the animating goals of a system of free
expression, prominently including the creation of
favorable conditions for democratic government.
Indeed, it sometimes seems as if free speech doctrine
is out of touch with the question of whether the free
speech principle is animated by identifiable goals at
all. My effort to challenge the half-truths is spurred
above all by a belief that whatever else it is about,
the First Amendment is at least partly designed to
create a well-functioning deliberative democracy.
When free speech doctrine disserves democratic
goals, something is seriously amiss.
I. HALF-TRUTH NUMBER ONE: THE
FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITS
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
It is commonly said that government may
not regulate speech on the basis of the speaker's
viewpoint.' Indeed, viewpoint discrimination may be
the defining example of a violation of the freespeech
guarantee. Thus, for example, government may not
prohibit Republicans from speaking on subways,
even though government may be able to prohibit
advertising on subways altogether, or even regulate
the content of speech on subways if it does so in a
viewpoint-neutral way.
If the First Amendment embodies a per se
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, then
government's first obligation is to be neutral among
different points of view. This principle recently
received prominent vindication in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 2 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a
"hate-speech" ordinance in significant part because
it embodied viewpoint discrimination.' The
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination has also
played a central role in the key modern case on
pornography regulation."
As a description of current free speech law,
the first half-truth has considerable merit. Upon first
examination, there are very few counterexamples,
and we can find a good deal of affirmative support
for the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.
Whatever its descriptive force, the prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination is not difficult to explain in
principle. It can be defended by reference to two
central constitutional concerns: the removal of
impermissible reasons for government action; and the
ban on skewing effects on the system of free
expression.
The notion that the First Amendment bans
skewing effects on public deliberation seems
reasonably straightforward, but the prohibition on
impermissible reasons is perhaps less clear. It should
be connected with the requirement that judges be
neutral.5 A judge in a civil case may not have a
personal stake in the outcome, even if that stake
would not affect his ruling. This ban on judicial bias
operates regardless of whether it affects the outcome.
So too, the First Amendment is best understood to
mean that government, in its regulatory capacity,
may not censor speech on the basis of its own
institutional interests.
How might these ideas justify the ban on
viewpoint discrimination? Imagine that a law forbids
criticism of the current administration. Here the
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reasons for government action are most suspicious,
for this sort of distortion of debate provides a good
reason for distrusting public officials. The free
speech clause declares offlimits certain reasons for
censorship, and the ban on viewpoint discrimination
seems admirably well-suited to ferreting out those
reasons. 6
Quite apart from the issue of impermissible
reasons, viewpoint discrimination is likely to impose
harmful skewing effects on the system of free
expression. The notion that the First Amendment
bans skewing effects on public deliberation is
connected with the idea that government may not
distort the deliberative process by erasing one side of
a debate. Above all, government may not distort the
deliberative process by insulating itself from
criticism. The very freedom of the democratic
process depends on forbidding that form of
self-insulation.
Thus far I have spoken of government
censoring speech about itself, and this is indeed the
most disturbing form of viewpoint discrimination.
But even if viewpoint discrimination does not have
this distinctive feature, there may still be cause for
concern. Imagine that government says that speech
in favor of the antitrust laws is permitted, but that
the opposite message is forbidden; or that state law
prevents people from criticizing affirmative action
programs; or that a city concludes the pro-life point
of view cannot be expressed. In these cases, too, the
governmental motivation may be out of bounds and,
even more fundamentally, the skewing effects on the
system of free expression may not be tolerable.
From both precedent and principle, it is
tempting to conclude that viewpoint discrimination is
always or almost always prohibited. Indeed, the
Supreme Court sometimes acts as if that is the case,
and this view may be coming to represent current
free speech orthodoxy.7 But there are many
counterexamples, and these greatly complicate
matters.
For example, there is a good deal of
viewpoint discrimination in the area of commercial
speech. Government can forbid advertising that
promotes casino gambling,' even if it does not
simultaneously forbid advertising that is opposed to
casino gambling. This prohibition is unquestionably
viewpoint-based. Moreover, government can and
does forbid advertising in favor of cigarette smoking
on television,' although government does not forbid
television advertising that is opposed to cigarette
smoking. On the contrary, there is a good deal of
such advertising. Precisely the same is true for
advertising relating to alcohol consumption. In
commercial speech, then, there is a good deal of
viewpoint discrimination.'o
As another example, consider the area of
labor law, where courts have held that government
may ban employers from speaking unfavorably about
the effects of unionization during the period before
a union election if the unfavorable statements might
be interpreted as a threat against workers."
Regulation of such speech is plausibly viewpoint
discriminatory, because government does not
proscribe employer speech favorable to unionization.
As a final example, consider the securities
laws that regulate proxy statements. Restrictions on
viewpoint can be found here, too, as certain forms of
favorable statements about a company's prospects are
banned, while unfavorable views are permitted and
perhaps even encouraged.
Almost no one thinks that there is a
constitutional problem with these various kinds of
contemporary viewpoint discrimination. The
restrictions are based on such obvious harms that the
notion that the restriction is "viewpoint based" does
not even have time to register. For example, casino
gambling, cigarette smoking, and drinking all pose
obvious risks to both self and others. Government
controls on advertising for these activities are a
means of controlling these risks. It is not entirely
implausible to think that a liberal society should
regulate or indeed ban some of these activities, 2
though this is extremely controversial, and our
government has generally not chosen to do so. If
government has the power to ban the activity, but
has decided instead to permit it, perhaps it can
permit it on the condition that advertising about it be
banned. This was the Supreme Court's reasoning in
the casino gambling case.
One could respond that this reasoning is
wrong because it permits a distinctively objectionable
form of paternalism. Some people think that the First
Amendment is undergirded by a principle of listener
autonomy, one that forbids government to ban
speech because listeners might be persuaded by it.14
On this view, the ban on advertising for cigarettes,
gambling, and alcohol consumption invades the
autonomy of those who would listen to such speech.
If we were serious about the principle of listener
autonomy, perhaps we would rarely allow
government to stop people from hearing messages.
This is a reasonable position, but it is not relevant to
my current claim, which is purely descriptive: laws
that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint are indeed
upheld in certain circumstances.
It is here that the first proposition emerges
as a half-truth. Viewpoint discrimination is indeed
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permitted, and the Court should not pretend that it is
always banned.' We might conclude from the cases
that viewpoint discrimination is not always prohibited
and that the Court instead undertakes a more
differentiated inquiry into the nature and strength of
government justifications in particular cases. What is
the nature of that more differentiated inquiry? I
suggest that it begins with the view that viewpoint
discrimination creates a strong presumption of
invalidity. In certain narrow circumstances, the
presumption is overcome because (a) there is at most
a small risk of illegitimate motivation, (b) low value
or unprotected speech is at issue, (c) the skewing
effect on the system of free expression is minimal,
and (d) the government is able to make a powerful
showing of harm. In the commercial speech cases,
for example, we are dealing with low-value speech,
and the risk of illegitimate motivation is small. In the
case of securities regulation, there is no substantial
skewing effect on free expression, and there is a
highly plausible claim that government is protecting
people against deception.
For present purposes, it is not necessary to
devote a good deal of attention to these various
considerations. My point is only that current law
does not embody a flat ban on viewpoint
discrimination. Certain forms of discrimination are
found fully acceptable. They are not seen in this way
only because the presence of realworld harms
obscures the existence of selectivity. The pretense
embodied in our first half-truth has impaired the
analysis of a number of free speech issues, including
those raised by hate speech and pornography. Instead
of relying on a per se rule, we should decide such
cases by inquiring more particularly into the nature,
legitimacy, and strength of government justifications.
There may be sufficiently neutral justifications for
apparent viewpoint discrimination in some such
areas. I do not, however, suggest such justifications
here.' 6
II. HALF-TRUTH NUMBER TWO: THE
REAL THREAT TO THE SYSTEM OF
FREE EXPRESSION COMES FROM
CONTENT-BASED GOVERNMENT
RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
The second half-truth is a generalization of
the first. It derives from the same basic framework.
I think that it is even more misleading; in any case,
it is the most important.
Our free-speech tradition, it is commonly
said, is especially hostile to content-based restrictions
on speech." The principal recent exponents of this
view see such restrictions as the most important
obstacles to the system of free expression." It is as
if the other obstacles are invisible, or not worth
attention at all. Indeed, the Court itself treats these
restrictions as the defining illustrations of threats to
democratic self-governance." Although there is
much to be said for this idea as a matter of principle,
it is in large part an artifact of our particular history.
The free speech tradition in America grows out of
the clear-and-present-danger cases featuring the
powerful dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis and
Holmes,' and culminating in the great case of
Brandenburg v Ohio.2 In all of these cases, the
government attempted to censor political speech on
the basis of its content.
The image bequeathed to the American legal
tradition by these cases is exceptionally pervasive. It
suggests that the real threats to free expression are
indeed a result of content-based regulation of speech.
Outside of the arguably distinctive context of
politics, government censorship of literature and the
arts also attests to the dangers of content-based
regulation. The symbolic power of the great Brandeis
and Holmes dissents is unrivalled, but other defining
cases involve content-based restrictions as well.
Consider in this connection the famous Ulysses
litigation 22 and the more recent, highly publicized
case involving the work of Robert Mapplethorpe.'
The antipathy to content-based regulation
thus derives great support from history. Moreover,
it is not hard to see the basis for the antipathy. If we
are fearful of illegitimate reasons for government
regulation, or if we are concerned about skewing
effects from regulation, then content-based regulation
is especially dangerous.
The basis for these judgments has been
spelled out in great and often convincing detail.'
Throughout the twentieth century, major dangers
have come from government regulations designed to
impose on the polity a uniformity of opinion, to
stifle artistic or literary diversity, and to entrench the
government's own self-interest. In an era in which
many countries are emerging from communist rule,
it is especially salutary to focus on the risks posed by
content-based regulation of speech.
But is it correct to say that the greatest
threats to free expression stem from content-based
regulation of speech? In contemporary America, I
believe that an affirmative answer will divert
attention from other important issues. Under current
conditions, the second half-truth may even have
become an anachronism. It renders other problems
invisible. It sees the First Amendment through the
wrong prism. It focuses attention on comparatively
trivial problems--pornography prosecutions,
commercial speech, private libel--and loses sight of
the large picture.
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Consider, for example, a conventional view
about freedom of expression. If we were to examine
recent books on this topic, we would generally find
a firm consensus that the system of free expression
is at risk to the extent that government censors
sexually explicit speech, purportedly dangerous
speech, or commercial speech on the basis of its
content.' The war against Ulysses is said to have
found a modern parallel in the attack on violent
pornography. The effort to deter a civil-rights
advertisement through use of libel law in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan' is said to be fundamentally
the same as the continuing application of libel law to
falsehoods about private people.' The restriction of
the speech of political dissidents is said to have a
modern analogue in the regulation of false and
misleading commercial speech."
Views of this sort are widespread.
Moreover, it may even be right to say that the
principal threats to free speech come from
content-based restrictions; but the claim needs to be
evaluated by reference to some sort of criteria. It
should not be treated as an axiom. Let me suggest
provisionally that we should evaluate any system of
free expression at least in part by attending to two
matters: the amount of attention devoted to public
issues and the expression of diverse views on those
issues. Use of these criteria accords well with the
original Madisonian vision of the First
Amendment." It also draws support from a range
of important writings, most prominently those of
Alexander Meiklejohn." Many people are skeptical
of the idea that the free speech principle should be
understood wholly through the lens of democracy."
But one need not think that the First Amendment is
exclusively or even primarily connected with
democratic self-government in order to conclude that
something is wrong if the system deals little with
public issues and contains little diversity of views.
If these are our governing criteria, I suggest
that the principal current problem is not
content-based restrictions on speech but rather a
speech "market" in which these values are poorly
served. It is comparatively unimportant if the
government is overzealous in its regulation of child
pornography, or if government regulates commercial
advertising that is not terribly deceptive. But it is far
from unimportant if the system of free expression
produces little substantive attention to public issues,
or if people are not exposed to a wide diversity of
views. If we are interested in ensuring such attention
and such exposure, we may not be entirely pleased
with the operation of the so-called free market in
speech.
In large part, this claim is a factual one. To
evaluate the claim, we need to have a very thorough
empirical understanding of the free speech "status
quo," and here there is a distressingly large gap in
the free speech literature. There are few more
important tasks for the study of free expression than
to compile information on existing free speech fare.
But a number of things do seem clear.3 2 In most of
the broadcasting that people watch, there is
exceedingly little attention to public issues. The
"soundbite" phenomenon assures that during
electoral campaigns, public attention will be focused
on marginally relevant matters--the "Murphy Brown"
controversy, escalating allegations of various
kinds--rather than on the real issues at stake. Such
attention as there is often centers on sensationalistic
anecdotes, usually with an unwarranted whiff of
scandal.
Coverage of public issues often involves
misleading "human interest" anecdotes, in which
people are asked how they "feel" about policies that
appear to have harmed them. Frequently public
issues are entirely absent. For example, the local
news sometimes consists of discussion about the
movie that immediately preceded it. Marketplace
pressures, including the desires of advertisers,
encourage the press to avoid substantive controversy.
Often advertisers affect content, partly by
discouraging serious discussion of public affairs,
partly by avoiding sponsoring controversial
programming, and partly by encouraging a favorable
context for their products." In the place of genuine
diversity of view, offering perspectives from
different positions, most of the broadcasting that
people watch typically consists of a bland, watered
down version of conventional morality. It would
therefore be extremely surprising if commercial
television were able to take a firm "pro-choice" or
"pro-life" position in a news special or a prime-time
movie, or a strong defense or critique of affirmative
action.
In these circumstances, some major threats
to a well-functioning system of free expression,
defined in Madisonian terms, come not from
content-based regulation, but from free markets in
speech. Market pressures are compromising the two
goals of a system of free expression. This is of
course only a contingent fact. It is a product of a
particular constellation of the current forces of
supply and demand. If market forces were different,
we might see a great deal of attention to public
issues and a large amount of diversity of view. But
under current conditions, this is hardly the case.
We might go further. The contemporary
problem lies not merely in market forces, as if these
were brute natural facts, but more precisely in the
legal rules that underlie and constitute those markets.
Broadcasters and newspapers are of course given
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property rights in their media. Without such
government grants, the speech market would be
entirely different. It is these rights--generally of
exclusive use--that make it possible for owners to
exclude people who would like to speak and be
heard. If a critic of a war, or of Roe v Wade,3'
cannot get onto network television, it is not because
of nature or "private power," but because legal rules
prevent him from doing so. Property laws at both the
federal and state levels make any efforts to obtain
access to television airwaves a civil or criminal
trespass.
Market forces are a product of law,
including the law that allocates entitlements. That
law, like all other, should be assessed for conformity
to the First Amendment. The law of property,
granting rights of exclusive use, is of course
content-neutral rather than content-based. When CBS
excludes someone from the airwaves, it is not
because government has made a conscious decision
to exclude a particular point of view. But it is also
untrue to say (as current law perhaps does)" that
government is not involved, that we have a problem
of "private power," or that there is no state action
for free speech purposes. There is a content-neutral
restriction on speech. The question is whether that
content-neutral restriction is helping or harming the
system of free expression. To make this assessment,
we should compare it with other possible systems.
Alternatives might include a "fairness doctrine" that
calls for attention to public issues and diversity of
view; a point system creating incentives to license
applicants who promise to cover important issues; a
system of subsidies and penalties designed to
increase coverage of important issues; or legal
restrictions on the power of advertisers over
programming content.
If our current system of free expression is
functioning poorly, it is because of the
content-neutral law that underlies current markets. I
believe that many important problems for the current
system of free speech in America lie not in
content-based regulation--which generally involves
peripheral issues and almost never strikes at what I
am taking to be the core of the free speech
guarantee--but instead in the operation of the free
market and in the legal rules that constitute it. In
these circumstances, it is worse than ironic that
people interested in the theory and practice of free
speech focus on such comparatively trivial issues as
commercial speech, disclosure of the names of rape
victims, and controls on obscenity. The principal
questions for the system of free expression lie
elsewhere."
III. HALF-TRUTH NUMBER THREE:
GOVERNMENT "PENALTIES" ON
SPEECH ARE FUNDAMENTALLY
DIFFERENT FROM SELECTIVE
FUNDING OF SPEECH
In the next generation, some of the most
important free speech issues will arise from selective
funding of speech. What if government funds some
artists but not others, imposes conditions on what
libraries may obtain, or regulates political expression
by refusing to pay for the literature of certain
causes? On the constitutional question, the Supreme
Court's cases are exceptionally hard to unpack. We
might distinguish five different propositions, which
in concert seem to reflect the current law. Once
we have them in place, we will be able to see the
key role of the third halftruth.
(A) Government is under no obligation to
subsidize speech. Government can refuse to fund any
and all speech-related activities. In this sense, it can
remain out of the speech market altogether.
(B) Government may speak however it
wishes. Public officials can say what they want.
There is no free speech issue if officials speak.
Speech of this kind "abridges" the speech of no one
else.
(C) Government may not use its power over
funds or other benefits so as to pressure people to
relinquish rights that they "otherwise" have. This is
an obscure idea in the abstract, but it can be clarified
through some examples. Government could not say
that as a condition for receiving welfare, people must
vote for a certain political party. Government could
not tell people that if they are to have drivers'
licenses, they must agree not to criticize the
President. In both cases, government makes funding
decisions so as to deprive people of rights of
expressive liberty that they would otherwise have.
But--and this is an important
qualification--government may indeed "condition" the
receipt of funds, or other benefits, on some
limitation on rights, if the condition is reasonably
related to a neutral, noncensorial interest. For
example, the government could forbid you from
working for the CIA unless you agree not to write
about your CIA-related activities, or could prevent
you from political campaigning if you work for the
federal government. 9  In both cases, the
government has legitimate justifications that do not
involve censorship. Its limitation on CIA employees
is designed to ensure the successful operation of the
CIA, which entails a measure of secrecy. Its
limitation on government employees is designed to
ensure that political campaigning does not
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compromise basic government functions. Of course
this principle will create some difficult line-drawing
problems.
(D) Government may not "coerce" people by
fining or imprisoning them if they exercise their
First Amendment rights. Fines and imprisonment are
the most conventional examples of free speech
violations. They do not raise "unconstitutional
conditions" issues at all, and may be approached far
more straightforwardly."
(E) The government may apparently be
selective in its funding choices. In other words,
government may direct its resources as it chooses, so
long as it does not run afoul of principles (C) and
(D) above. Government may give funding only to
those projects, including those speaking projects, of
which it approves. Thus government may fund art,
literature, or legal and medical care and impose
limits on the grantees, even on their speech, if the
limits regard what may be done with government
money.
Rust v. Sullivan, a highly controversial
Supreme Court decision, is the source of this last
proposition."' In Rust, the Court suggested that so
long as government is using its own money, and not
affecting "private" expression, it can channel its
funds however it wishes. The problem arose when
the Department of Health and Human Services issued
regulations banning federally-funded family-planning
services from engaging in (a) counseling concerning,
(b) referrals for, and (c) activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning. The
plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that these
restrictions on abortion-related speech violated the
First Amendment. In particular, they argued that the
restrictions discriminated on the basis of point of
view. The Court disagreed, holding:
The Government can, without
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternate
program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. In so doing, the
Government has not discriminated on the
basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the
other.42
In response to the claim that the regulations
conditioned the receipt of a benefit on the
relinquishment of a right, the Court held that "here
the government is not denying a benefit to anyone,
but is instead simply insisting that public funds be
spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized. "4 3
Rust seems to establish the important
principle that government can allocate funds to
private people to establish "a program" that accords
with government's preferred point of view. In this
area, even viewpoint discrimination is permitted. In
fact, the Court seems to make a sharp distinction
between government "coercion" -- entry into the
private realm of markets and private interactions --
on the one hand and funding decisions on the other.
Hence we arrive at our third half-truth: Government
may not "penalize" speech (propositions (C) and
(D)), but it may fund speech selectively however it
chooses, by allocating its funds to preferred causes
(propositions (A) and (E)).
This view captures an enduring principle,
one that will inevitably play a role in the
constitutional law of freedom of expression. Often
government has legitimate justifications for treating
funding decisions differently from criminal
punishments. As noted, it may conclude that people
who work for the CIA must refrain from speaking on
certain matters, on the ground that the speech could
compromise national security. Hence government
could conclude that if it is to provide people with the
benefit of CIA employment, it may condition their
speech. So too, the President could conclude that
Cabinet-level employees must speak in ways of
which the President approves. Without imposing this
kind of condition on speech, the President's power to
execute the laws would be severely compromised.
The condition is therefore acceptable. It can be
justified by reference to sufficiently neutral
justifications.
But the sharp distinction between penalties
and subsidies is inadequate. It is far too simple. It
sets out the wrong sets of categories. Most generally,
there are no such fundamental distinctions among the
law that underlies markets, the law that represents
disruption of markets, and the law that calls for
funding decisions. All are law, and the First
Amendment directs us to assess each in terms of its
purposes and effects.
To make the point a bit more dramatically:
All constitutional speech cases are in an important
sense unconstitutional conditions cases. When the
government says that someone will be fined for
speaking--our category (D) above--it in effect
imposes an unconstitutional condition. It is generally
saying that your property--which is, as a matter of
fact, governmentally conferred" --may be held only
on condition that you refrain from speaking. To be
sure, a case of this sort is not seen as one of
unconstitutional conditions at all. But this is only
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because existing holdings of property are seen,
wrongly, as pre-political and pre-legal. To support
the outcome in category (D), it would be more
precise to say that a condition is usually
unconstitutional when government is using its power
over property that it has created through law to
deprive you of something to which you are otherwise
entitled--and you are always otherwise entitled to
property that you now own. But to put things in this
way would be to place funding cases and other cases
on the same analytic ground. The sharp split drawn
in Rust is therefore misconceived. It is here that the
distinction between penalties and subsidies is merely
a half-truth.
We may go further. The First Amendment
question is not whether there is a subsidy or a
penalty. For two reasons, it is wrong to ask that
question. First, the question is exceedingly hard to
answer; it forces us to chase ghosts. Second, it is
essentially irrelevant. 5 We might have a perfectly
acceptable "penalty," and we might have an
impermissible refusal to subsidize.
The first problem is that in order to decide
whether there is a subsidy or a penalty, we need a
baseline to establish the ordinary or
normatively-privileged state of affairs. When
government denies Medicaid benefits to artists, has
it penalized speech, or has it refused to subsidize it?
We cannot answer that question without saying what
it is that artists are "ordinarily" or "otherwise"
entitled to have." The Constitution does not really
answer that question, and without a textual resolution
it is very difficult for courts to resolve it on their
own.
More important, the First Amendment does
not say that "penalties" on speech are always
prohibited and that "subsidies" are always allowed.
Even if we could tell the difference between the two,
we would not have accomplished very much.
Perhaps government can "penalize" speech when it
has legitimate justifications for doing so. Perhaps
government must sometimes subsidize speech when
its failure to do so is grounded on an impermissible
reason. The notions of penalty and subsidy seem to
truncate analysis at a too early stage.
I do not claim that funding decisions
affecting speech should be treated "the same" as
other sorts of government decisions that affect
speech--whatever this ambiguous claim might mean.
The development of constitutional limits on funding
that interferes with expression raises exceedingly
complex issues. But for now, we have reason to
doubt whether our third half-truth, and Rust, would
be taken to their logical extreme. Can it seriously be
argued that government could fund the Democratic
Convention but refuse to fund the Republican
Convention? Is it even possible that government
could give grants only to academic projects reflecting
governmentally-preferred viewpoints? More likely,
Rust will come to be understood as a case involving
private counselling rather than public advocacy, in
the distinctive context in which a ban on abortion
counselling is ancillary to a ban on the performance
of abortions. It will not be taken to authorize
government selectively to subsidize one point of
view in a controversy over some public issue.
In short: Adherence to the First Amendment
requires an analysis of the effects of selective
funding on the system of free expression, and of the
legitimacy of the government justifications for
selectivity. A sharp split between penalties and
subsidies will not do the job; some penalties are
acceptable and some selective subsidies are not. The
third half-truth is thus rooted in anachronistic ideas
about the relationship between the citizen and the
state. It poses a genuine threat to free speech under
modern conditions.
IV. HALF-TRUTH NUMBER FOUR:
CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON
SPEECH ARE WORSE THAN
CONTENT-NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS
ON SPEECH
We arrive finally at the last and most general
half-truth. From what has been said thus far, it
should be clear that the Supreme Court is especially
skeptical of content-based restrictions and especially
hospitable toward content-neutral restrictions .4
Content-based restrictions are presumed invalid.
Outside the relatively narrow categories of
unprotected or less protected speech--libel,
commercial speech, fighting words, and so on--the
Court rarely upholds content-based restrictions. By
contrast, content-neutral restrictions are upheld so
long as they can survive a form of balancing. In
undertaking that balancing, the Court is often highly
deferential to government judgments about the need
for contentneutral restrictions. One of the most
striking developments in recent law is the Court's
increased hostility to content-based restrictions and
its increased deference to content-neutral ones.
Indeed, the distinction between the two kinds of
restrictions seems to become sharper every term.
Thus it is striking to compare the recent invalidation
of a relatively narrow content-based restriction--the
ban on cross-burning--with the recent validation of a
broad content-neutral restriction--the ban on
solicitation in airports."8
There is much to be said in favor of this
fourth half-truth.49 As noted, it does tend to capture
current law. Moreover, it makes considerable sense
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as a matter of principle. Generalizing only slightly
from the previous discussion of viewpoint-based
restrictions, we might conclude that content-based
restrictions are peculiarly likely to stem from an
illegitimate government reason, and peculiarly likely
to have intolerable skewing effects on the system of
free expression. A law that forbids AIDS-related
advertising on subways, for example, is more
objectionable than a law that forbids all advertising
on subways. Content-neutral restrictions are far more
trustworthy, for the reasons for regulation are apt to
be more legitimate and the skewing effects less
worrisome. On this basis, a legal system could do far
worse than to set out a presumption against
content-based restrictions and a presumption in favor
of content-neutral ones.
These presumptions should not, however, be
pressed too hard. There are cases in which
content-neutral restrictions are especially damaging,
and cases in which content-based restrictions are not
so bad. Suppose, for example, that government
forbids all speech in airports, train stations, and bus
terminals. Here we will have a fundamental intrusion
on processes of public deliberation. Indeed, one of
the most effective strategies of tyrants is to limit the
arenas in which public deliberation can take place.
Surely this sort of intrusion is more severe than what
arises when, for example, small public universities
ban a narrow category of racial hate speech. The
content-neutral restriction may seriously restrict the
number of expressive outlets and thus impair the
system of democratic deliberation. It may also have
content differential effects: when people are
prevented from engaging in door-to-door canvassing,
or from using public parks, there are severe adverse
effects on poorly financed causes. Moreover, some
content-based regulation--consider a limited ban on
racial hate speech or narrow classes of violent
pornography--is at least plausibly a modestly
intrusive corrective to an already content-based status
quo. Whether or not such contentbased regulations
should be upheld, it seems wrong to think that
regulations of this sort are automatically more
objectionable than regulations that are
content-neutral.
I do not suggest that the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral regulations is a
failure, or that it should be abandoned. The danger
arises if the doctrine becomes too rigid and
mechanical. There is a risk, for example, that the
current Court will become exceptionally receptive to
content-neutral restrictions on speech, giving them
the strongest presumption of validity. It is possible
that something of this kind has already occurred.
There is also a risk that outside of a few narrow
categories, the Court will invalidate all content-based
restrictions without looking seriously at the reasons
for regulation in the particular case. But many
content-neutral restrictions have extremely harmful
consequences and some content-based restrictions are
founded on adequate justifications. The fourth
half-truth is dangerous above all because in its
rigidity, it operates as a substitute for close analysis
of particular problems.o
CONCLUSION
With any well-elaborated body of legal
doctrine, there is a pervasive danger that the
doctrinal lines and distinctions will take on a life of
their own. The purposes and goals that gave rise to
those lines and distinctions sometimes become
increasingly remote. This is, I believe, the source of
the problem with all four half-truths. The larger
goals of free speech doctrine have often been
abandoned in favor of continued attention to
particular doctrines that serve those goals in only
partial and indirect ways.
It is of course possible to debate the content
of those larger goals. Much ink has been spilled on
that highly-contested question."' But we need not
enter into especially controversial territory in order
to assert that at least a part of the justification for a
strong free speech principle is its contribution to the
American conception of self-government. This
conception--associated with the Madisonian view of
free speech--helps explain the persistence of each of
our half-truths. All of them can be seen at least in
part as efforts to protect against skewing effects on
democratic deliberation and illegitimate government
efforts at self-insulation. It is for this reason that the
propositions I have discussed can fairly be described
as half-truths, rather than as simple illusions.
But the four half-truths have indeed taken on
a life of their own, and in important ways they
disserve the system of free expression. In their
generality ,and abstractness, they distract attention
from current threats to the system of free expression
and, even worse, they threaten to make those threats
invisible as such. One of the extraordinary
characteristics of the American system of free
expression is its capacity to grow and change over
time. If the system is to promote democratic goals in
the twenty-first century, I suggest that the four
half-truths should be recognized not only for their
contributions to human liberty, but also for their
limitations and their damaging effects on some of the
most important current free speech controversies.
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence,
University of Chicago Law School. Some of the
discussion here draws on the more detailed treatment
in Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of
Free Speech (Free Press, 1993).
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the statutory regulation
of the relationship between broadcasters and
candidates for elective office is an example of
congressional commitment to democracy. Through
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act -- the
anti-censorship provision -- Congress has attempted
to level the playing field for all legally qualified
candidates for office.' Section 315(a) allows for the
presentation of candidates' unvarnished positions on
issues important to the voting public. Democracy,
however, is not always pretty.
Often, political issues of public interest and
concern are couched in offensive or racially charged
language. In fact, broadcasters' concerns over the
content of political advertisements are not new. In
the late 1950s, the concerns centered on whether
licensees could be held liable for defamatory
statements made by a candidate in a political ad.'
Two major cases occurred during the 1970s. In one,
a civil rights group asked the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
to banish the word "nigger" from the airwaves,' and
another requested that broadcasters eliminate racial
slurs from political advertisements." In the 1980s,
employees of a radio station were concerned that a
candidate's use of the word "bullshit" in the course
of a political ad could offend members of the
audience.'
In the 1990s, the ads that caused the
collision between political candidates' interests and
those of broadcasters have centered around abortion,
perhaps the most divisive social issue of the 1980s
and 1990s. Specifically, in 1992, the ads for
Republican congressional candidates Michael Bailey
of Indiana and Daniel Becker of Georgia contained
graphic pictures of aborted fetuses.' The abortion
ads were broadcast during the early afternoon and
prime time. One broadcaster, fearing public outrage,
asked the FCC to (1) declare ads containing abortion
pictures indecent and (2) allow broadcasters to
channel political ads containing pictures of aborted
fetuses to hours when children were less likely to be
in the audience.
The FCC has defined indecency as
"language that describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities or organs. "' In order to protect children
from indecent material, the FCC has traditionally
channeled indecent programs to the late hours of the
evening. This period, known as "safe harbor,"
begins around midnight.'
Broadcasters, who for years have been
fighting the FCC's attempts to regulate indecency,
asked the Commission to declare graphic depictions
of aborted fetuses "indecent. "o The broadcasters'
central concern appeared to be that if they showed
pictures of aborted fetuses at times when children
may be in the audience and those pictures were
indecent, the FCC could hold stations in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1464, the indecency statute."
The controversy over the use of abortion
pictures in political ads does not end there. While
Section 312(a)(6) of the Communications Act 2
states that a station may lose its license for violating
Section 1464 -- which punishes the use of obscene,
indecent, or profane language over the airwaves --
Section 315(a) forbids any censorship of political
advertisements, and Section 312(a)(7)" requires
that broadcasters give candidates running for federal
office reasonable access to their stations or risk
losing their licenses. The conflict between these three
statutes has caused confusion and concern among
broadcasters and raised questions that have not yet
been answered conclusively.
For example, if a federal candidate chooses
to use graphic depictions of aborted fetuses in
campaign ads and those pictures were declared
indecent, would the channeling of the ads be a
violation of Section 312(a)(7), 315(a), or both? If the
pictures were indecent and broadcasters aired them
as required by law, would broadcasters violate
Section 1464 and Section 312(a)(6) of the
Communications Act? Or does the anti-censorship
clause of Section 315 protect them from liability?
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Finally, where does the First Amendment stand
among these conflicting interests?
These are just some of the questions that the
current controversy over political advertising has
raised. Although this Article cannot answer all of
them, the importance of the issues outlined above
requires that an attempt to do so be undertaken.
Part I of this Article will focus on the law
governing political advertising, specifically the
reasonable access requirement for federal candidates,
Section 312(a)(7), and the anti-censorship provisions
of the political advertising rules, Section 315(a). Part
II will look at the law regulating broadcast
indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and 47 U.S.C. §
312(a)(6), which has been the main weapon
broadcasters have used in their attempt to channel
abortion political ads to hours when children are
least likely to be in the audience. Part III will
examine the use of abortion pictures in ads by
political candidates and the controversy and reactions
such ads have stirred. Finally, Part IV will review
the constitutional and statutory implications of the
proposed channeling of indecent political
advertisements.
I. STATUTES GOVERNING POLITICAL
BROADCAST ADVERTISING
Two sections of the Communications Act,
Sections 312(a)(7) and 315(a), generally control
political advertising over the broadcast media for
federal candidates. Section 312(a)(7), known as the
"reasonable access rule," allows the FCC to impose
the "death penalty," or license revocation, for willful
failure to make time available for purchase by
federal candidates.14 The FCC has interpreted the
reasonable access rule to require that broadcasters
accommodate the requests of individual candidates
for airtime to the maximum extent possible.'"
Likewise, the FCC has said that reasonable access
requires that broadcasters provide access to
candidates during prime time.'6
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the reasonable access
rule. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, the Court said that
once the political campaign began, broadcasters had
to consider each request for time from a federal
candidate and make a reasonable effort to
accommodate it.'" The case involved a request to
the networks from the Carter-Mondale campaign to
broadcast a thirty-minute documentary approximately
eleven months prior to the election. While CBS
offered five minutes of prime time, both NBC and
ABC said they were not ready to sell any time for
the 1980 campaign at such an early date.'9
The networks argued that the FCC's decision
that the Carter-Mondale campaign had been denied
"reasonable access" interfered with the editorial
decisionmaking of broadcasters.' But the Supreme
Court said that broadcasters who adopted blanket
policies denying access to candidates were in
violation of the reasonable access rule.2 1 Thus,
while a blanket policy was likely to be more
convenient for broadcasters, the Court said
compliance with Section 312(a)(7) required that
broadcasters take into account the campaign needs of
federal candidates. 22
Once a station has complied with the
requirements of Section 312(a)(7) and agreed to
make time available, it then faces the strict
requirements of the anti-censorship rule of Section
315(a). This section prohibits the broadcast licensee
from censoring material submitted for broadcast by
the candidate.' Even if the material contained in
the ad is libelous, the Supreme Court has ruled that
a licensee is prohibited from deleting it. In Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union of America v.
WDAY, Inc.,' the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
WDAY, a small radio station in rural North Dakota,
could not delete Union references to certain
government officials as "Communists." The Court
said that "permitting a broadcasting station to censor
allegedly libelous remarks would undermine the
basic purpose for which [Section] 315 was passed --
full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by
legally qualified candidates. " Since broadcasters
were legally bound by the anti-censorship provision,
the Court affirmed the FCC interpretation that
compliance with Section 315(a) granted broadcasters
immunity from liability for any statements made by
political candidates.
Similarly, if after agreeing to provide a
candidate with broadcast time a station learned that
the candidate's appearance would involve the
expression of highly inflammatory or extremely
unpopular points of view, the station could not then
refuse to carry the candidate's material. In 1972, the
FCC denied a request from the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
that broadcasters be allowed to reject political ads
that contained the word "nigger" and other highly
offensive language.Y The NAACP claimed that the
ads of J. B. Stoner, a self-proclaimed white
supremacist, posed an "immediate threat to the safety
and security of the public."28 The NAACP argued
that since stations airing Stoner's ads had allegedly
received bomb threats, avoiding the broadcast of
racially charged advertisements was the
"responsibility of [a] licensee under the public
interest standard. "2 The FCC denied the NAACP
request, citing Farmers as precedent, and declared
that after an investigation there was no evidence that
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stations had actually received bomb threats." Thus,
said the Commission, there appeared to be no clear
and present danger of imminent violence. The FCC
concluded by saying that a "contrary conclusion
would permit anyone to prevent a candidate from
exercising his rights under Section 315 by
threatening a violent reaction."" The Commission
also ruled that "the public interest is best served by
permitting the expression of any views that do not
involve 'a clear and present danger of serious
substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.'" 2
In 1978, after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,3 3 Julian Bond,
of the NAACP, asked the FCC to declare the word
"nigger" obscene, thus preventing the word from
being used over the airwaves.3 In Pacifica, the
Supreme Court affirmed an FCC ruling that declared
a George Carlin monologue containing the words
"shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker,
and tits"35 indecent. The FCC had defined
indecency as "language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium,
sexual or excretory activities or organs. "6 The
Court's decision allowed the FCC to regulate the
times at which indecent words could be used on the
air in order to protect children.
The NAACP petition erroneously construed
the Supreme Court decision to declare Carlin's seven
"dirty" words "obscene" rather than "indecent." The
FCC denied the NAACP's request, saying the word
"nigger" did not fit the definition of indecency
advanced in Pacifica. Moreover, the FCC said
that "even if the Commission were to find the word
'nigger' to be 'obscene' or 'indecent,' in light of
Section 315 we may not prevent a candidate from
utilizing that word during his 'use' of a licensee's
broadcast facilities."3
In a 1980 case, Citizens Party presidential
and vice-presidential candidates Barry Commoner
and LaDonna Harris asked NBC Radio to air an ad
that contained the word "bullshit. " Commoner and
Harris filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that
NBC Radio had violated the anti-censorship
provision of Section 315. Commoner and Harris
claimed that an NBC employee rejected the ad, and
it was not until after the advice of NBC's legal
counsel that the station agreed to run the
commercial.'
Although the FCC found that NBC had not
violated Section 315(a), the Commission said the
"initial reactions of the NBC staff in rejecting the
spot and urging its modification were clearly in
error." "'Thus, the Commission warned NBC to
ensure that its staff was aware that political ads could
not be censored even if offensive language was used.
II. BROADCAST INDECENCY: A KNOTTY
PROBLEM
Section 1464 restricts the broadcast of
"indecent" material. If a broadcast licensee violates
the indecency statute, Section 312(a)(6) of the
Communications Act empowers the FCC to revoke
the license.
The standard used to regulate indecency
comes from FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.4'2 As
stated above, in Pacifica the U.S. Supreme Court
held that comedian George Carlin's monologue
Seven Dirty Words was indecent. For the nine years
following the 1978 Pacifica decision, the FCC
generally took no action against broadcasters for
indecency violations. Meanwhile, broadcasters felt
that airing indecent material between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. was "safe" because there was less risk that
children would be in the audience. 3
In a series of rulings in 1987, however, the
Commission revived its regulation of indecent speech
and greatly broadened the scope of its
applicability." The new indecency policy reached
beyond the "seven dirty words" listed in Pacifica,
and included material that fit the general definition of
indecency. The FCC also ruled that the beginning of
the safe harbor should be moved from 10 p.m. to
midnight.4 5
On June 1, 1987, the National Association
of Broadcasters and other groups filed a petition for
clarification of the rulings." On December 29, the
Commission acknowledged that the regulation of
indecent material was a sensitive task due to the
possibility of infringement on the broadcasters' First
Amendment rights. 47  The Commission said,
however, that it had an obligation to enforce the
indecency restrictions, and that by enforcing Section
1464, it was advancing the government interest in
protecting children from offensive material and
allowing parents to decide what children would see
or hear. 8
In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit struck down the
"channeling" provision of the FCC ruling. In Action
for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT I),49 the
court upheld the Commission's power to prohibit
indecent broadcasting during the day and to expand
the scope of what constituted indecency. However,
the ACT I court held that the FCC lacked evidence
to support the change of the 10 p.m. safe harbor.'
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The reaction from Senate conservatives was
swift. Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) pushed a bill
through Congress ordering the FCC to draft
regulations for a twenty-four-hour ban on
indecency. 5 ' As required, the Commission drew up
a regulation to enforce the legislation,5 2 but the
regulations were quickly challenged by broadcasters
and stayed by the courts while the Commission
collected public comment.5 ' After the comment
period, however, the FCC again announced a
twenty-four-hour ban, which was challenged by
broadcasters. 4 In 1991, the D.C. Circuit Court
declared the 'round-the-clock ban unconstitutional in
Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT
II).5 The ACT II court ordered the Commission to
conduct a "full and fair hearing" to determine the
times at which indecent material may be
broadcast.'
In the meantime, Congress was busy drafting
another law that would restrict broadcast indecency
to the hours between midnight and 6 a.m. on all
commercial and most noncommercial stations.
Although the midnight to 6 a.m. safe harbor was
declared unconstitutional by the ACT I court,
President Bush signed the bill funding public
broadcasting,' which contained the measures
restricting broadcast indecency. The FCC was
expected to implement the new safe harbor early in
1993, ' but Action for Children's Television
obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit an order staying the
midnight to 6 a.m. safe harbor. In November 1993,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
struck down the latest attempt to implement the safe
harbor provision, but later vacated the opinion and
granted a rehearing en banc.
III. ABORTION ON THE AIR AND IN THE
HOME
In the meantime, attention nationwide
became riveted on the Bailey antiabortion ads after
the Indiana Republican won the May 5, 1992,
primary in an upset.' Bailey's spots included
photos of healthy infants labeled "Choice A"
followed by bloody photos of what the ad claimed
were aborted fetuses, labeled "Choice B."6 Fellow
Republican congressional candidate Daniel Becker of
Georgia aired similar ads later that summer on CNN,
ESPN, and during Atlanta Braves games on
Superstation WTBS. 2  WTBS Executive
Vice-President and General Manager Terry Segal
said the station received hundreds of complaints from
parents, who were worried their children would see
the abortion ads."
In July, Becker submitted his ads to another
Atlanta television station, WAGA-TV, a property of
Gillett Communications. Gillett resisted running the
spots and petitioned the FCC for a ruling that would
declare the ads "indecent," allowing WAGA to
restrict their broadcast to the midnight to 6 a.m.
period.' Gillett argued that the depictions of dead
fetuses covered with "menstrual gore" constituted
"excretory" activity, thus bringing the political ad
within the definition of indecency. Gillett then asked
the Commission to determine whether Section 1464
of Title 18 was an exception to the application of
Section 315(a), and if so, whether channeling ads
containing graphic pictures of aborted fetuses would
be a violation of Section 312(a)(7).6
In a letter denying Gillett's petition, Roy
Stewart, chief of the Commission's Mass Media
Bureau, said that restricting commercials like
Becker's would violate a candidate's right of
"reasonable access" to a broadcast station.' Stewart
said that "[a]s a general matter, broadcasters may not
direct candidates to unwanted times of the day or
evening."' Stewart said that after reviewing
Becker's ad, FCC staff found it was not indecent and
that fetal tissue, or fetuses themselves, were not
"excrement."" To support the FCC decision,
Stewart said that Gillett failed to provide any legal
precedent that would bring images of aborted fetuses
within the definition of "excretory," and therefore,
within the definition of indecency. Thus, the Mass
Media Bureau chief expressed reluctance to expand
that definition. Finally, since the FCC staff did not
find the ad indecent, Stewart said it was not
necessary to reach the issue of whether Section 1464
overrode Sections 315(a) or 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act.W
As the race came down to the last few weeks
of the campaign, controversy over Becker's
advertising heated up. In late October, Becker
campaign workers attempted to schedule a
thirty-minute political advertisement called Abortion
in America: The Real Story, on WAGA-TV.70 The
campaign wanted to buy time to run the ad between
4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on Sunday, November 1.7' After
reviewing the tape and seeing that it contained about
four minutes of graphic footage of an abortion
procedure, the station again contended the ad was
indecent and should not be run at the time
requested.72
On Thursday, October 29, 1992,
Gillett/WAGA filed suit in the U.S. District Court in
Atlanta seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.73
WAGA asked the court whether it could "channel"
the thirty-minute spot to the safe harbor hours --
between midnight and 6 a.m. -- without violating the
reasonable access and anti-censorship provisions of
the Communications Act. The next day Judge Robert
H. Hall declared the ad indecent and allowed WAGA
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to channel it as requested. 74 Judge Hall said that
Section 1464, which regulates the broadcasting of
indecent material, constituted an exception to the
reasonable access and anti-censorship requirements
of the Communications Act." Judge Hall said his
decision did not "significantly undercut" the purpose
of the reasonable access and anti-censorship
provisions of the Communications Act: "namely to
prevent discrimination against candidates and to
allow candidates a full opportunity to relate to the
public their political stand. "6
Becker appealed Hall's decision to the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which referred
the matter to U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who handles emergency matters
in that circuit. Kennedy denied the request without
comment on Saturday, October 31, letting stand the
lower court's decision."
On October 30, the same day that Judge Hall
approved WAGA's plan to channel Becker's ad, Roy
Stewart, the FCC's Mass Media Bureau chief, sent
a letter to Daniel Becker.7 ' The letter informed the
candidate of WAGA's concern that the broadcast of
Becker's political advertisement would violate
Section 1464. Stewart acknowledged that the
Commission had never formally considered how the
anti-censorship and indecency statutes should be
reconciled. However, Stewart noted that in a 1984
letter to Congressman Thomas A. Luken (D-Ohio),
then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler wrote that "the
application of both traditional norms of statutory
construction as well as an analysis of the legislative
evolution of Section 315 militates in favor of reading
Section 1464 as an exception to Section 315."
Stewart cautioned that because there were no
definitive guidelines, it would be reasonable for
broadcasters to rely on the informal opinion that the
Commission had given to Congressman Luken.
Because of the importance of the controversy,
Stewart said the FCC was issuing a public notice
seeking public comment on the issues concerning
noncensorship of political ads and indecency. In the
meantime, Stewart said broadcasters could channel to
the safe harbor period political programming that the
broadcaster "in good faith believes is indecent."'
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
CONSIDERATIONS
Over a period of years the courts and the
FCC have adhered closely to a position affirming the
preeminence of Section 315(a) over several other
attractive positions. In refusing to yield a politician's
right to broadcast his message in the face of possible
civil unrest, the Commission has made it clear that
unsettling and even abhorrent political messages have
a place in the debate of political issues.
In fact, both First Amendment scholars and
the U.S. Supreme Court have acknowledged the
paramount position of political speech in the scheme
of self-government. For instance, First Amendment
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn carried the concept of
freedom beyond a simple lack of interference from
the government: "The freedom that the First
Amendment protects is not, then, an absence of
regulation. It is the presence of self-government. "
The U.S. Supreme Court echoed that sentiment a
few years later, holding that "speech concerning
public affairs is . . . the essence of
self-government. "8 The Court elaborated on that
position and extended it explicitly to political
advertising in 1976 with the declaration that "it is of
particular importance that candidates have the . . .
opportunity to make their views known so that the
electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public
issues before choosing among them on election
day."
Section 315(a) has also triumphed over
indecency and obscenity. On the heels of the 1978
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation decision, the
Commission turned aside an attempt by Julian Bond
of the NAACP to characterize a word at least as
offensive as those used in Pacifica as obscene or
indecent. The FCC ruled that even if the word
"nigger" were indecent or obscene, the
anti-censorship language of Section 315 prevented
the Commission from taking any action."
This reluctance by the FCC to expand the
category of words or materials that fits the definition
of indecency was recently affirmed. In its August 21,
1992, letter to legal counsel for WAGA, the
Commission refused to expand the definition of
indecency to include fetal tissue as "excretory"
material. The Commission said that neither the
expulsion of fetal tissue nor fetuses themselves
constituted "excrement. "8 Had the FCC expanded
the scope of what constitutes indecent material, it
would have represented a significant departure from
the traditional application of the concept.
The issue of abortion pictures in political
advertisements has opened a new avenue that
requires the FCC to interpret the limits of the
definition of indecency. Historically, the FCC has
not found indecency outside the realm of pandering,
vulgar, or titillating depictions of sexual or excretory
activities or organs.r Although the Commission has
classified certain explicit language as indecent,
context has often been a determining factor for
finding a violation of Section 1464. For instance, in
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a case involving National Public Radio's All Things
Considered program, the FCC refused to declare that
a segment about organized crime boss John Gotti
was indecent. The Commission said that while it
recognized that the use of the word "fuck" and
"fucking" throughout a segment of a news story was
patently offensive, when considered in context the
language was an integral part of a bona fide news
story. The FCC added that traditionally it had
avoided intervening in the editorial judgment of
broadcast licensees on how best to present serious
public affairs programs." Likewise, the
Commission has refused to take action for a violation
of the indecency statute when stations have discussed
sexual subjects in a serious manner. The FCC found
that a frank discussion of sexual techniques in a
program entitled Unlocking the Great Mysteries of
Sex was not intended to pander or titillate and was
not otherwise vulgar or lewd.' In another case,
however, the FCC found that on-air vulgarities were
indecent when used repeatedly by disc jockeys who
also solicited audience participation using similar
language. The Commission refused to view
audience-participation programs as serious news.
This finding negated the station's claim that the
vulgar language was neither pandering nor
titillating."
Given the emphasis the Commission has
placed on context -- whether a program is serious or
attempts to pander and titillate -- it appears the use
of graphic pictures of aborted fetuses in political
advertisements does not fit within the pattern of FCC
actions for violations of Section 1464. Moreover, the
unambiguous posture of the Supreme Court toward
Section 315(a) in Farmers weighs heavily in favor of
taking the power to regulate offensive political ads
out of the hands of broadcasters. In Farmers, the
Court recognized that to give broadcasters latitude in
determining what should be deleted would undermine
the very purpose of Section 315."
The issue in Farmers was whether, despite
Section 315(a), broadcasters could censor libelous
remarks from a candidate's advertisement. Although
the current controversy deals with indecency, the
Court's reasoning in Farmers should be applicable.
After all, to determine whether a political ad is
indecent, a broadcaster must first judge the content
of the commercial. The Farmers Court said that:
The decision a broadcasting station would
have to make in censoring libelous discussion by a
candidate is far from easy. . . . Yet, under the
petitioner's view of the statute [deciding whether a
statement is libelous] . .. would have to be resolved
by an individual licensee during the stress of a
political campaign, often, necessarily, without
adequate consideration or basis for decision.'
More recently, the FCC has been equally
reluctant to rely on broadcasters' good faith
judgments to determine what is indecent. In 1987,
the FCC rejected a plea from broadcasters who
asked that reasonable licensee judgments preclude an
FCC finding that material broadcast violated the
indecency provision of Section 1464."
On the other hand, the issue of channeling a
political ad because it is indecent conflicts with the
reasonable access requirement -- Section 312(a)(7) of
the Communications Act. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,
Chief Justice Burger said the requirements of Section
312(a)(7) included the accommodation of a
candidate's advertising needs, as determined by the
candidate.' Thus, under CBS, forcing a candidate
into undesirable time slots is not an accommodation
of the candidate's needs, but a unilateral decision
made on other grounds by the broadcaster.
In 1980, the FCC recognized that censorship
can take "many forms besides the outright refusal .
. . to broadcast a political spot."' More recently,
in its response to WAGA's request that ads
containing pictures of aborted fetuses be declared
indecent, the FCC characterized channeling as a
form of censorship under Section 315 that violated
Section 312(a)(7)."
CONCLUSIONS
The law is clear on the power of the FCC to
punish broadcasters who violate the indecency statute
during entertainment programming.' However,
when the context of the indecent language is political
advertising, broadcasters should be immune from
liability under Farmers. In addition, under the
standard applied by the Commission in the Julian
Bond case?' broadcasters have traditionally been
powerless to prevent a candidate from using
offensive material in advertisements.
While Farmers precludes any censorship of
an ad's content, CBS requires that broadcasters
accommodate the campaign needs of political
candidates for federal office. Despite the possible
impact that political ads depicting abortions may
have on children, Section 315(a) bans any censorship
by broadcasters. This prohibition should include
channeling because channeling would in fact violate
the principles affirmed in both Farmers and CBS.
Taken together, Section 312(a)(6) of the
Communications Act and 18 U.S.C. § 1464 allow
the FCC to revoke a broadcaster's license if
indecency and obscenity are allowed on the air.
These - statutes conflict directly with the
anti-censorship mandate of Section 315(a) of the
Communications Act, however, and no appellate
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court has addressed the interpretation of the
conflicting provisions. To date, the only evidence
that has been arrayed against the Farmers precedent
is an informal 1984 letter' and the district court
decision involving Becker.'" Thus, until an
appellate court, or ultimately the U.S. Supreme
Court, resolves the conflict, there is no reason to
fear the heavy penalties prescribed by Section
312(a)(6) for the violation of Section 1464,
particularly given the U.S. Supreme Court's
unequivocal position in Farmers.
As the previous discussion has demonstrated,
broadcasters' concerns that airing potentially
indecent political ads may bring about sanctions for
violation of Section 1464 appear to be unwarranted.
On the other hand, any expansion of the definition of
indecency could lead to future incursions into that
category of speech, which broadcasters are likely to
abhor.
Even though, in light of the Farmers
decision, broadcasters would not be liable for the
broadcast of political ads containing pictures of
aborted fetuses, in order to be responsive to their
audience's concerns, broadcasters may want to
implement some kind of warning when political ads
containing graphic pictures of aborted fetuses are
broadcast. This would allow viewers to exercise their
discretion. For instance, broadcasters could have a
twenty-second disclaimer that contains both an aural
and visual component. Once the warning is given,
the picture could fade to black before the political ad
appeared on the screen.
Who would bear the cost of the additional
twenty seconds is a matter that will likely stir
additional debate. Considering that it is the choice of
a political candidate to use pictures that have a
potentially harmful or disturbing impact on viewers,
particularly children, it would not be unreasonable to
require candidates to bear the cost of the warning.
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HIGH COURT DECLINES FREE SPEECH CHALLENGE
Copyright 1994 New York Law Publishing Company
New York Law Journal
June 1, 1994, Wednesday
The Supreme Court refused yesterday to
limit the authority of government-sponsored events
such as fairs, festivals and parades to bar
"inappropriate" groups from participating.
The Court, over a dissent by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, refused to hear the appeal of an
advocacy group opposing abortion that said its
free-speech rights were violated when it was
excluded from the 1990 "Great Pumpkin Festival" in
Frankfort, Ky., Capital Area Rights to Life v.
Downtown Frankfurt Inc., 93-1201.
The case had involved issues raised in the
dispute involving New York City's annual St.
Patrick Day Parade.
For several years, the parades sponsors have
refused to allow homosexual rights groups from
marching. In 1992, a federal judge ruled that city
officials could not force the sponsor to allow
participation by such groups.
The Kentucky dispute stemmed from the
refusal of the sponsors of a civic festival promoting
the revitalization of Frankfort, the state's capital, to
allow Capitol Area Right to Life (CARTL) to
participate by having a booth. At a similar festival
a year earlier, the group drew complaints by giving
plastic fetuses to children.
Last July, the Kentucky Supreme Court
ruled that while the sponsor was a government agent
because the city was delegated contol of the festival
to it, no constitutional violation occurred.
"It is a critical fact . . . that CARTL's
counterparts, the National Organization for Women
and the Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights,
were also denied booths," Kentucky's highest court
ruled. Members of all three groups are still free to
attend the festival and talk about their causes, the
court said.
Fired Workers' Suits
In a second case, the Justices gave public
employers added protection from lawsuits by
workers fired for making statements later found to be
constitutionally protected, Waters v. Churchill,
92-1450. It ruled in all Illinois case that public
employers cannot be forced to pay damages if, at the
time of the firing, they reasonably believed the
worker simply was being insubordinate.
The decision yielded four separate opinions,
and none commanded a majority. But in the main
opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote for herself and
three other Justices that employees can be fired for
making insubordinate statements even if they made
other statements that would be constitutionally
protected.
The case involved a nurse, Cheryl Churchill,
fired a hospital district after another nurse reported
Ms. Churchill had criticized her supervisor and said
the obstetrics department was a bad place to work.
The fired nurse contended she actually had been
criticizing her supervisors' policy of using nurses
inexperienced in obstetrics to make up a staffing
shortage in the department. The ruling set aside a
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision allowing
the suit.
Copyright a 1994 The New York Law Publishing
Co. Reprinted with permission.
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ALBANY IN ACCORD ON SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR HASIDIC GROUP
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
July 2, 1994, Saturday, Late Edition Final
James Dao, Special to The New York Times
Just four days after the United States
Supreme Court ruled that a public school district
created specially for ultra-Orthodox Jews was
unconstitutional, Gov. Mario M. Cuomo and
legislative leaders reached agreement today on a bill
that would allow the district to continue operating.
The legislation is intended to address
constitutional issues raised by the high court when it
struck down the Kiryas Joel Village School District
in Orange County, which was created by the
Governor and Legislature in 1989 to serve about 200
Satmar Hasidic children with disabilities.
The Hasidic parents did not want to send
their children to the local public schools but wanted
to receive Federal and state aid to pay for special
education.
Critics of the arrangement contend that it
fragments education at a time when the state is trying
to consolidate school districts. They argue that the
Legislature is responding to the political power of
the Hasidim, a charge that lawmakers deny.
The Supreme Court majority had ruled that
establishing the district amounted to improper
favoritism toward religion in general and one sect in
particular. But in drafting their bill, the Legislators
seized on an opening they believed was supplied by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who said in a
concurring opinion that the district might have been
permissible if it had been created through legislation
applicable to any municipality, not just Kiryas Joel,
a village about 50 miles northwest of Manhattan
whose residents are all Satmar Hasidim.
The lawmakers said their new bill would
meet that standard by allowing all municipalities that
fit specific criteria to establish new school districts.
Currently, only state education officials can create
new districts, something that rarely happens.
Legislative aides said that between 20 and 60
towns in addition to the village of Kiryas Joel, could
create new school districts under the new bill.
"It's right on point with Justice O'Connor's
decision," said Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, a
Manhattan Democrat who sponsored the bill. "It's
mentioned in the ruling that if it's done this way, it
would be fine."
But critics of the legislation said it addressed
the concerns of only one justice and not necessarily
the court's majority. And they charged that the
Governor and Legislature had rushed to help the
12,000-resident Satmar community because they are
thought to vote and give political contributions in a
bloc.
"I'm personally disappointed in the utter
disrespect and disregard the Governor and
Legislature have for the Supreme Court," said Louis
Grumet, executive director of the New York State
School Boards Association. "This law would
encourage the very balkanization I thought everyone
was moving against."
Mr. Grumet, who brought the original court
challenge against the Kiryas Joel district, said the
School Boards Association as a group and he as an
individual taxpayer would challenge the new
legislation in court.
Intent to Move Quickly
But supporters of the bill said they had to act
quickly because the legislative session is scheduled
to end this week. And they said there is little
evidence that the Satmars have the political clout to
make an entire Legislature act.
"It is offensive to say we are helping the
Jewish community because they vote and participate
in the political process," said Assembly Jules
Polonetsky, a Brooklyn Democrat who co-sponsored
the bill.
Mr. Grumet and other critics also contended
that Mr. Cuomo, who has spoken passionately about
the importance of keeping church and state separate,
had used legal technicalities to sidestep a Supreme
Court ruling on that very issue.
'A Duty to Protect'
Mr. Cuomo could not be reached for
comment this afternoon. But earlier this week he said
he had signed the Kiryas Joel legislation in 1989
because "I believe government has a duty to protect
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and serve all its citizens, regardless of their religious
beliefs."
He added, "I believe that while the
Constitution, thankfully, bars government from
forcing anyone to be religious, it does not mandate
that we punish people for being religious."
The Legislature was expected to pass two
bills that would deal with Kiryas Joel. The first
would abolish the existing school district, but allow
existing educational services to continue until a new
school district is formed, possibly this summer.
The second would establish criteria for
creating new districts: Municipalities must have at
least 2,000 students and come from established
districts with at least 4,000 students. New districts
would have to be at or above the state average in
wealth and leave behind districts whose wealth would
be essentially unchanged.
Those measures were designed to prevent
small towns from creating new districts and to insure
that wealthy villages could not secede from school
districts that include poor areas.
A Three-Step Process
A new district would require three steps of
approval: first from the municipal council, then from
the local electorate and finally from two-thirds of the
existing school district's board of education.
When told of the legislative agreement,
residents of Kiryas Joel responded ecstatically. "For
my child, it means the difference between a nice life
and nothing, barrenness," said Judith Gluck, whose
six-year-old son attends the school district. "Every
time I talk about it, my tears well up."
Copyright c 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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ATTACKING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
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Bruce Fein
Last Monday, the -U.S. Supreme Court
perversely employed the doctrine of church-state
separation as a sword against laudatory government
accommodation of religion.
Writing for the majority in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District vs.
Grumet, Justice David Souter decried the creation of
a special school district to facilitate the receipt of
secular educational services for handicapped Hasidic
Jews. But the Constitution should celebrate, not
chastise, such enlightened government sensitivity.
Incorporated in 1977 and holding a
population approximating 8,500 today, the village of
Kiryas Joel is overwhelmingly inhabited by Hasidic
Jews. They scrupulously resist encounters with
modernity, although seclusion is not mandated by
their creed. As Justice Souter elaborated: "They
interpret the Torah strictly; segregate the sexes
outside the home; speak Yiddish as their primary
language; eschew television, radio, and
English-language publications; and dress in
distinctive ways that include headcoverings and
special garments for boys and modest dresses for
girls. Children are educated in private religious
schools."
A pair of 1985 Supreme Court decisions
forced the government to withdraw special
educational services for handicapped children of
Kiryas Joel provided on private religious school
premises. The educational services remained
available at public schools outside the village, but
were generally shunned by Hasidic parents. Their
handicapped children suffered "panic, fear and
trauma" from immersion in a public school culture
that warred with their own.
In 1989, to accommodate the Hasidic
culture, the New York legislature constituted the
village as a separate school district with an elected
board of education empowered to operate a secular
public school system. The district, however, chose to
confine itself to a secular special educational
program for handicapped children because the
nonhandicapped preferred their parochial schools.
The school superintendent, a non-Hasidic, was a
20-year veteran of the New York public school
system possessing bilingual, bicultural, and special
educational expertise. Teachers and therapists resided
outside the village, and no religion was smuggled
into the purely secular curriculum. In sum, the
school district operated without offending even the
most ardent church-state separationist.
Justice Souter, however, insisted that the
creation of the school district itself affronted the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. To
reach that astonishing conclusion, he conjured up
reasons that might be likened to interpretive
thaumaturgy.
The establishment clause inarguably
prohibits government from favoring one religion
over another, or religious adherents generally over
nonadherents. According to Justice Souter, New
York transgressed that neutrality by drawing a school
district boundary that would inevitably eventuate in
Hasidic control of the board of education. But that
should have been constitutionally irreproachable. The
boundaries were intended to accommodate the special
educational needs of handicapped children and
Hasidic culture, not to champion or emblazon the
Hasidic creed. And it was happenstance that the
former would be accomplished through a public
school district inhabited virtually exclusively by a
particular religious group, a happenstance
comparable to the Mormon political juggernaut in
Utah that was foreordained when Utahwas admitted
as a state. Since government officeholders are
required to act with religious neutrality, their
religious affiliations should be of no constitutional
moment. Indeed, the Supreme Court declared in
McDaniel vs. Paty (1978) that constitutionally
protected religious freedom prohibits government
from handicapping individuals in the electoral
process based on their religion or nonreligion.
Justice Souter also faulted the New York
legislature for failing to ensure that non-Hasidic
groups would be equally accommodated. He fretted:
"[W]e have no assurance that the next similarly
situated group [to the Hasidic Jews] seeking a school
district of its own will receive one." But until such
a request is denied, there is no justification for
constitutional reproach. Not an iota of evidence
suggesied the legislature was recalcitrant toward a
non-Hasidic supplication during the five years
postdating creation of the special school district, or
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would be so in the future. Nor were the Hasidics
politically daunting with their puny 8,500 village
population. Roman Catholics would seem to wield
substantially more clout.
It speaks volumes, moreover, that the
constitutionality of the school district was assailed by
citizen-taxpayers, not by a religious adherent or
group alleging a denial of equal accommodation.
And it is commonplace for government to create
legislative exceptions with reference to particular
religious practices without anticipating what might be
legislatively required in the future by the
constitutional mandate of religious evenhandedness.
Federal law, for instance, permits the "use of peyote
in any form in connection with the religious
practices, sacraments or services of the Native
American Church." And the National Prohibition Act
legalized "wine for sacramental purposes."
If New York, in fact, ever strayed from the
constitutional obligation of religious neutrality in
establishing special school districts, the activist
jurisprudence of Justice Souter would find no
difficulty in slaying the heresy. Further, Justice
Souter's neutrality worry seems contrived; he
nowhere hints that New York's objective could be
saved by authorizing an administrative body to create
special school districts at request, coupled with an
injunction of evenhandedness among religious
groups.
Something is rotten in the state of
constitutional law when legislatures are instructed to
display religious callousness. The sermonizing of
Grumet should evoke lamentations, not hallelujahs.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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JUSTICES UNITE FOR EXPRESSION VIA A YARD SIGN
Copyright 1994 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
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Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
It is a simple idea: putting a sign on the
lawn or a banner in the window to announce one's
politics or the baby's arrival. But the city of Ladue,
Mo., an exclusive suburb of St. Louis, was
concerned about appearances and said no such signs
were allowed.
Yesterday, free speech prevailed.
In a broadly written opinion, the Supreme
Court ruled 9 to 0 that cities may not prohibit
residents from putting political or personal signs in
their yards. The decision confirmed the rights of
people to use their property to express themselves,
whether it be to say, "For Peace in the Gulf' (which
the city forbade) or "Dear Santa, Julie lives here"
(which escaped enforcement).
The court stressed the venerable tradition of
communicating through signs and banners at one's
home.
"A special respect for individual liberty in
the home has long been part of our culture and our
law," Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the court,
"That principle has special resonance when the
government seeks to constrain a person's ability to
speak there."
Stevens added that signs are an unusually
cheap and convenient form of communication,
"especially for persons of modest means or limited
mobility."
The ruling, plainly showing the First
Amendment limits that municipalities face in trying
to control visual blight, casts doubt on numerous
sign ordinances throughout the country.
"Our sincere concern from this decision is
that the Supreme Court has broken new ground that
strikes at the very core of local land use and zoning
ordinances," said Jordan B. Cherrick, who
represented Ladue.
Ladue's ordinance generally prohibited all
signs within its 8.5 square miles. However,
exemptions were allowed for real estate signs, road
and safety hazard signs, health inspection signs,
public transportation markers and commercial signs
in commercially zoned or industrial districts.
Officials said that since its founding in 1936,
Ladue has tried to protect the aesthetics of the leafy,
insular community.
The ordinance was challenged by Margaret
Gilleo who, in late 1990 as the U.S.-led war with
Iraq was imminent, put a small antiwar sign in the
second-floor window of her colonial-style home. The
sign said "For Peace in the Gulf."
Lower courts ruled for Gilleo, saying Ladue
was wrongly favoring some speech "content" over
others by allowing real estate signs but forbidding
political protest.
Yesterday, the Supreme Court agreed, but
rather than saying that the ordinance discriminates on
the basis of the signs' message as the appeals court
had, the high court said it simply prohibits too much
speech.
"Ladue has almost completely foreclosed a
venerable means of communication that is both
unique and important," Stevens said. "It has totally
foreclosed that medium to political, religious, or
personal messages. Signs that react to a local
happening or express a view on a controversial issue
both reflect and animate chance in the life of a
community."
Being able to speak from one's home is
often critical to the message, he said, rejecting the
city's arguments that people could use letters,
handbills, fliers, telephone calls and other media to
communicate. "A sign advocating 'Peace in the Gulf'
in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated
war veteran may provoke a different reaction than
the same sign in a 10-year-old child's bedroom
window or the same message on a bumper sticker of
a passing automobile."
Stevens acknowledged that cities have good
reasons to be concerned about some signs. "Unlike
oral speech, signs take up space and may obstruct
views,*distract motorists, displace alternative uses for
land, and pose other problems that legitimately call
for regulation."
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The ruling does not affect cities' ability to
regulate the size and number of home signs, and
Stevens suggested residents themselves, trying to
keep up property values, likely are a check on sign
proliferation.
The justices' unanimity in the case was
unusual. Typically, disputes over municipal
regulations have produced splintered opinions on
what First Amendment test should be used. Only
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote separately in
City of Ladue v. Gilleo. She said in a concurring
statement that the court should have used its
traditional analysis of looking at whether the city was
trying to stifle the content of certain messages, rather
than approaching the case so broadly.
Gilleo was elated. A community activist, she
already had announced she was running for Congress
to represent Missouri's 2nd District. She said
yesterday that she now would put up a campaign sign
in her front yard.
Several municipal organizations, including
the National League of Cities and U.S. Conference
of Mayors, had sided with Ladue. They contended
that Ladue was not trying to exclude certain
messages but rather deal with the problem of sign
proliferation.
o 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
permission.
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SUPREME COURT CONNECTS CABLE TV
TO FREE SPEECH PROTECTIONS OF PRESS
The Washington Post
June 28, 1994, FINAL Edition
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court unanimously said for the
first time yesterday that cable television is entitled to
nearly the same constitutional guarantees of free
speech as newspapers and magazines.
The ruling will have no immediate impact on
cable television viewers, but it will give cable
systems, telephone companies and other "Information
Age" communications systems new protection against
government interference and an advantage over
broadcasters who are subject to more regulation.
The ruling left unresolved the dispute that
was at the heart of the case: whether Congress can
require cable systems to devote up to one-third of
their channels to retransmitting the signals of local
television stations.
Bruce Collins, C-SPAN general counsel,
said yesterday he was disappointed that the court did
not strike down the "must carry" regulations which
require the cable systems to carry some local
programming instead of other television programs
available nationally, for example, C-SPAN.
Even so, Collins said, the case was
important for its "defining statement about the First
Amendment rights of cable. In the old days, cable
was considered ancillary to broadcasters."
Congress adopted "must carry" provisions in
a 1992 cable rate law to offset what it saw as a
competitive imbalance between the cable industry
and over-the-air broadcasters. Sixty percent of all
TV viewers subscribe to cable. Members of
Congress feared that advertisers would lose interest
in locally based commercial and educational channels
if the government did not require cable to carry
them.
Cable operators attacked the regulations as
a violation of their free speech rights. Meanwhile
some cable viewers complained that channels that
were personal favorites were dropped to make room
for local broadcasts.
While there was unanimity for enhanced
constitutional protection for cable, a narrow
five-justice majority refused to strike down the "must
carry" regulations, as the cable industry had sought.
The majority said the regulations may be
constitutional because they were intended to preserve
access to free television rather than control the
content of cable programs. With Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy writing for the court, the majority said the
regulations "are not designed to favor or
disadvantage speech of any particular content,"
rather "to protect broadcast television from ... unfair
competition. "
Dissenting justices, led by Sandra Day
O'Connor, countered that the regulations were
impermissibly aimed at program "content" and
should be rejected as a violation of free speech. The
Kennedy majority sent the case back to a lower court
for additional findings.
Most significantly, the ruling set up new
legal ground rules for cable television and
wire-based communications systems. The justices
said for the first time that such communications
should have more protection from governmental
interference under the First Amendment than
broadcasters, who traditionally have been subject to
more regulation because of the scarcity of channels.
"Cable television does not suffer from the
inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast
medium," Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote in a
section of the opinion joined by all the justices.
"Indeed, given the rapid advances in (technology),
soon there may be no practical limitation on the
number of speakers who may use the cable
medium."
Kennedy, joined by all of the justices, said
a cable regulation should be upheld only if it furthers
an "important or substantial" government interest.
That speech standard is not quite as high as
protections traditionally accorded newspapers, but it
is greater than protections for broadcasters.
Yet even with a new standard, yesterday's
decision will not necessarily allow cable companies
to escape from federal regulations that force them to
carry local broadcasting.
Kennedy, writing in this portion for five
justices, said a D.C. federal court now must
determine how financially burdened the broadcast
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industry would be without the "must carry" a 1994. The Washington Post. Reprinted with
requirement. He said it was "significant" that no permission.
evidence that local broadcast stations have fallen into
bankruptcy had been presented in an earlier hearing.
The U.S. District Court here upheld the regulations
last year.
O'Connor, writing a partial dissent, said the
regulations ensure that cable programmers will be
dropped in favor of broadcasters.
They "are an impermissible restraint on the
cable operators' editorial discretion as well as on the
cable programmers' speech," O'Connor wrote. "For
reasons related to the content of speech, the rules
restrict the ability of cable operators to put on the
programming they prefer, and require them to
include programming they would rather avoid."
For television watchers, the ruling suggests
that cable companies will continue to be required to
offer local commercial and educational broadcast
stations such as Washington's Channel 50, or
Howard University Television's Channel 32.
The trade-off, according to cable spokesmen,
is that in some areas, C-SPAN or the Discovery
Channel, for example, will not offered.
Broadcasters, cable companies and the
government accentuated the positive yesterday.
Daniel Brenner, of the National Cable
Television Association, lauded the new legal
standard for cable and contended the industry would
be able to show a lower court that the congressional
regulations were not justified because "the economic
state of broadcasting is robust."
But Reed Hundt, chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission, and Jack Goodman,
of the National Association of Broadcasters, asserted
that the regulations are necessary to keep some local
broadcasters in business.
Joining Kennedy were Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist and Justices Harry A. Blackmun and
David H. Souter. Justice John Paul Stevens, who
said he wanted to uphold the "must carry" rule,
agreed to become the crucial fifth vote.
O'Connor was joined in the dissent by
Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Clarence Thomas.
The case is Turner Broadcasting Corp. v.
Federal Communications Commission.
Staff writer Paul Farhi contributed to this report.
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ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A Practical Test for
Distinguishing Commercial Speech from Fully Protected Speech
Copyright 1993 American Marketing Association
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing
1993 Fall, Vol. 12, No. 2; Pg. 170
Ross D. Petty
Because of the substantially greater amount of
regulation that is allowed under the First Amendment
for commercial speech compared with fully protected
speech, it is important to be able to distinguish
between the two consistently, correctly, and simply.
This task is complicated by the increasing merging of
traditional product advertising and corporate image
advertising. The author reviews what little guidance
the Supreme Court and commentators have provided
on making this distinction and then proposes a
simple method for accomplishing this task. If people
are likely to be influenced by the speech in their role
as consumers of goods and services, the speech
should be deemed commercial. If they are likely to
be influenced in their capacity as members of the
electorate, or in some other nonconsumer capacity,
the speech should be considered fully protected. This
model can be readily applied by marketing managers
and is consistent with Supreme Court cases.
The First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." This prohibition has been applied to
branches of the federal government other than
Congress. It also has been applied to state and local
governments. Its basic purpose was to ensure free
debate on political issues [Rome and Roberts 1985].
As summarized by Cohen [1978] and
detailed by Linn [1988] and Eberle [1992], the
United States Supreme Court initially held that
commercial speech was not entitled to First
Amendment protection. It reversed this holding in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council [1976], in which a citizens group
challenged a Virginia state law that declared it
"unprofessional" for a pharmacist to advertise the
price of its prescription drugs. The Court held that
speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction" is entitled to some First
Amendment protection.
The Court based its holding on the fact that
"society also may have a strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information." It stated [p. 765]:
So long as we preserve a
predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private
economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial
information is indispensable.
Though holding that commercial speech is
protected by the First Amendment, the Court
specifically noted the propriety of (1) reasonable
"time, place, and manner" regulation; (2) possibly
regulating commercial speech in the electronic media
because of problems unique to that media; (3)
prohibiting commercial speech that proposes illegal
transactions; and (4) restrictions of false or
misleading commercial speech. It justified these
limits to the First Amendment protection of
commercial speech because of this type of speech's
objective nature (more easily verifiable than other
types of speech) and its profit-driven durability-the
Court labelled commercial speech the "sine qua non
of commercial profits."
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission of New York [1980], the Court
clarified, over rigorous dissent by Justice Blackmun,
that all commercial speech is entitled to less First
Amendment protection than fully protected speech.
Justice Blackmun disagreed with this dichotomous
treatment of speech and argued that both types of
speech are entitled to full protection generally,
subject to the exceptions noted in Virginia Board.
Despite his dissent and similar arguments by
commentators [e.g., Eberle 1992; Shiffrin 1983], the
Court currently allows greater regulation of
commercial speech than it allows for fully protected
speech.1
The government cannot regulate such fully
protected speech unless the regulator advances a
compelling state interest and the means used to
regulate speech is closely related to advancing that
interest [Bates v. Little Rock 1960]. Moreover, for
fear of "chilling" valuable speech, the Supreme
Court .has decided that false statements made in
political speech receive First Amendment protection
unless the false statement was deliberately and
knowingly made [New York Times v. Sullivan
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1964]. It also generally condemns any restraint of
fully protected speech prior to its dissemination,
even if that speech could be regulated after its
expression [Bantam Books. Inc v. Sullivan 1963].
The Supreme Court allows greater
government regulation of commercial speech. In
addition to the Virginia Board exceptions discussed
previously, the Court repeatedly has stated that false
or misleading statements in commercial speech and
proposals for illegal transactions can be prohibited
[e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
1985, p. 638]. Similarly, commercial speech that is
subject to abuse, such as in-person solicitation by
attorneys after accidents when the victim is
vulnerable and may be pressured into representation,
may be banned [In re R.M.J. 1982, p. 2031.
Furthermore, in a recent 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court decided that truthful commercial
speech can be completely prohibited if the product or
service it concerns could be banned [Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. 1986]. This
extends the concept that speech proposing illegal
transactions is not protected to include speech
proposing transactions that the government could
choose to make illegal even if it has not decided to
do so. In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.
[1993], the Court followed this concept by upholding
a federal statute that prohibited broadcasters located
in states with no state lottery from accepting
advertising for lotteries run by other states. The
Court refused simply to find that the advertising
could be banned as a lesser included power to
prohibit lotteries themselves. Rather, it applied a
Central Hudson analysis and found that the statute
directly advanced and reasonably fit the government
interest of balancing the interests of lottery and
non-lottery states. Though the 127,000 North
Carolina residents that listened to Edge were exposed
to lottery advertising from the nearby Virginia
media, the Court held that reducing their exposure to
such advertising by 11 % (the proportion of radio
listening time accounted for by Edge) was significant
and directly advanced the government's interest.2
However, there are limits to the amount of
acceptable regulation of commercial speech.
In-person solicitation by certified public accountants
is not subject to the same sorts of abuse as attorney
solicitation and cannot be banned [Edenfield v. Fane
1993]. In addition, commercial speech that is not
actually or inherently misleading, but only
potentially misleading, can be regulated but not
completely prohibited [Peel v. Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission of IL 1990, p. 4687].
In 1980, the Supreme Court established a
four-part test for analyzing the acceptability of
governmental regulation of commercial speech under
the First Amendment [Central Hudson Gas &
Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York
1980]. First, did the speech concern lawful activity
and was it not misleading? If so, it is protected by
the First Amendment. Second, was the asserted
governmental interest substantial? Third, did the
regulation directly advance the governmental
interest? Finally, was the regulation no more
extensive then necessary to serve the government
interest? [Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission of New York 1980, p. 566].
The Court recently clarified that its requirement that
commercial speech regulation be no more extensive
than necessary to advance the state interest is a less
stringent requirement than the "closely related"
requirement for fully protected speech [Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox
1989].
Therefore, as the Board of Trustees decision
emphasizes, the Supreme Court allows more
government regulation of commercial speech than
fully protected speech. This distinction is of critical
importance for those companies engaging in
communications other than product advertising.
For example, Schumann, Hathcote, and
West [1991] suggest that expenditures on corporate
advertising, that is, advertising that describes or
identifies the corporation itself and/or its activities or
views, are significant. They suggest that between
40% and 60% of reasonably large companies employ
corporate advertising. It accounts for about 1% of all
advertising expenditures, which may sound minimal,
but amounts to over $100 million. Individual
companies may spend tens of millions of dollars on
corporate advertising.
According to Schumann, Hathcote, and West
[1991], the purposes of corporate advertising vary
and have changed over time. Initially, it was
employed to obtain goodwill and portray a positive
company image. During the troubled 1970s, it
became more of a platform for advocacy on
important public issues. Today, it is often viewed as
a support function to promote the products or
services offered by the company.
Contrary to Schumann, Hathcote, and West
[19911, a recent survey of corporate advertisers by
the Association of National Advertisers [1990]
suggests the primacy of corporate advertising's
original goal of obtaining good will and portray a
positive company image. Approximately
three-quarters of the respondents in both the 1990
and the 1988 surveys indicated that one objective of
their corporate advertising was to provide a level of
awareness about the company and enhance its
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reputation. Support for product and service
marketing efforts declined from nearly 60% in 1988
to less than 33% in 1990. Informing and educating
the public on issues of importance to the company
increased slightly as an objective from 20% of the
respondents in 1988 to 25% in 1990.
The modest estimates of the amounts of
corporate advertising do not necessarily include the
"hybrid" advertising that is now emerging [Hartigan
and Finch 1986]. Such advertising informs about the
company, possibly a public issue, and the company's
products or services. Thus, with corporate
advertising and "hybrid" advertising, the line
between product advertising and other types of
communication that might be characterized as fully
protected speech appears ever blurring.
This article assists managers considering
corporate or hybrid advertising by presenting a
simple model for determining whether a particular
campaign will be deemed commercial speech subject
to regulation or fully protected speech under the
First Amendment. This model also could be used by
the courts in deciding such cases.
The remainder of this article first examines
how the Supreme Court says it distinguishes
commercial speech from fully protected speech. The
proposed model is then explained and compared with
proposals of other commentators. Finally, a series of
"close cases" are examined as applications of the
proposed model.
The Supreme Court's Approach to Distinguishing
Types of Speech
Despite the well-articulated difference in
levels of First Amendment protection for commercial
and political speech, the Supreme Court has provided
less guidance on how to distinguish one from the
other. It has stated that it relies on a "common
sense" approach and defined commercial speech as
that which does "no more than propose a commercial
transaction." [Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 1976, p.
785]. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public
Service Commission of New York [1980, p. 561],
the Court suggested a somewhat broader category of
commercial speech: "expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience."
It also has noted [p. 562] that advertising that "links
a product to a current public debate" is not political
speech.
The most definitive guidelines are provided
by Bolger v. Youngs Drug Product Corp. [1983],
which involved a pamphlet on venereal disease and
the use of condoms as a preventive measure. It
identified the advertiser as a producer of a particular
brand of prophylactic. The Court recognized that the
pamphlets were not merely proposals to engage in
commercial transactions. It did, however, note that
the pamphlets (1) were produced as traditional
advertisements (not public service announcements),
(2) referred to specific products, and (3) were
prepared with a profit motive. On balance, it decided
that the combination of all three of these factors
made the pamphlet commercial speech.
The Court then limited the usefulness of this
ruling by announcing that all of these characteristics
were not necessary for speech to be commercial and
refused to comment on whether reference to a
particular product was necessary. It did suggest that
in cases in which reference to a particular brand of
product was not made, the speech may still be
characterized as commercial if the message made
generic reference to the product and the speaker was
either the dominant firm in the industry or a trade
association [Bolger v. Youngs Drug Product Corp.
1983, pp. 466-67].
Thus, though the Supreme Court has not
articulated a single, clear method for distinguishing
political and commercial speech, it consistently has
examined one or more of three factors: (1) the
commercial nature of the content (e.g., proposing a
commercial transaction or reference to a product),
(2) the motivation of the speaker (economic or
political), and (3) the format of the message (e.g.,
paid-for advertising).
Recently, the Supreme Court has stated that
in Fox, it had described the proposal of a
commercial transaction as "the test for identifying
commercial speech" [City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc. 1993, p. 12]. The Court had
previously held that the profit motive of speech by
itself does not automatically relegate the speech to
the commercial level [Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connoughton 1989, p. 2685; City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. 1988, p.
756, n. 5]. Indeed, in Central Hudson [1980, p.
561], Justice Stevens criticized this factor as overly
broad and the majority decision in City of Cincinnati
appears to agree with this criticism by noting that
this factor was not relied on in Bolger or Fox.
Similarly, the Court also has held that the format of
the message is not very useful in determining
whether speech is commercial or political. Most
political messages are paid advertisements. For
example, in New York Times v. Sullivan [1964], the
Supreme Court found that notices in the New York
Times denouncing police retaliation against civil
rights -demonstrators in the South to be fully
protected speech, despite the fact that the statements
were paid-for advertising. Thus, today it seems
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clear that the proposal of a commercial transaction is
the definitive test for determining if speech is
commercial.
An Audience Impact Model
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has given
little guidance on how to determine whether speech
proposes a commercial transaction. For this reason,
defining commercial speech may be analogous to
Justice Stewart's celebrated comment on how he
defines obscenity: "[1] know it when I see it"
[Jacobellis v. Ohio 1964, p. 197]. This article
proposes a more objective methodology by
examining the likely effect of the speech on the
audience. Is the audience influenced or potentially
interested in the speech in their capacity as
consumers or as members of the electorate? If the
audience is influenced predominantly in their
capacity as consumers, then the speech should be
deemed commercial. If the ads would exert greater
influence over the audience in its capacity as
members of the electorate or the general populace,
then the ads are fully protected speech.
Four types of evidence are relevant to this
inquiry. First and most obvious is the message itself.
Judges viewing the message will form an opinion as
to how it is likely to influence people.
Communications experts can be called to assist in
evaluating the likely impact of the message. Product
advertising often explicitly proposes a commercial
transaction by describing price, financing terms,
availability, or attributes of the product that
consumers would value. Second, the intent of the
speaker is important. Again for product advertising,
even that which promotes product image, the
documented intent is to sell the product. Advertising
effectiveness is ultimately judged by how well it will
likely sell a product even if other variables are
measured, such as effect of the advertising on
product beliefs, attitudes, or intention to purchase.
Third, in situations in which the commercial speech
itself and the intent behind it are ambiguous,
audience testing may be conducted to determine if
consumers are influenced by the message in their
capacity as consumers. Fourth, in some cases there
may be evidence that sales of a particular product
increased after the dissemination of the challenged
message. Increased sales suggests that people were
influenced in their capacity as consumers.
Though deceptive advertising is outside the
scope of First Amendment protection, the audience
impact model is similar to current practice of
advertising regulation. The first step in an
advertising challenge, whether by industry
self-regulation, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), or a competitor under the Lanham Act, is to
interpret the advertising [Petty & Kopp 1993]. In this
step, explicit claims in the advertising are identified.
Implicit messages are typically established by
evidence showing the advertiser intended to make
such claims or marketing studies of audience
interpretation of the advertising. The marketing
studies seek to determine what messages are
communicated to consumers.
In attempting to determine whether speech is
commercial or fully protected, the marketing studies
typically used in advertising challenges would be
modified. Instead of determining the advertising
message or claims, studies used as evidence under
the audience impact model would attempt to
determine whether the communication interests
people as consumers or in some other capacity.
Because it is difficult to establish a communication's
likely effect on behavior, determining the attitudes
targeted by a communication may be an acceptable
surrogate. Are the targeted beliefs likely to influence
people's behavior as consumers or citizens? If this
model were adopted by the courts, this would be an
important area of further research and refinement by
marketing researchers.
This proposal is consistent with Supreme
Court definitions of commercial speech. Obviously,
speech that is likely to influence people in their
capacity as consumers is explicitly or implicitly
proposing a commercial transaction. The speech
necessarily has commercial content. As noted
previously, the other two Supreme Court factors,
motivation and format, recently have been relegated
to a minor role in determining whether speech is
commercial or fully protected.
The model proposed here, though simple in
its application, is innovative because it examines the
content of the message, by not only analyzing the
message per se and the intent behind the message,
but also attempting to determine its likely interest to
the audience. The question is not so much what the
speech says as how it is likely to interest people,
influence their beliefs, and motivate them to take
action.
When applying this model it is important to
distinguish speech as a product from speech that may
be trying to sell a product. Books, posters, and
artwork are all examples of types of speech products
that may be sold. Consumers may see a framed
inspirational poem or a political protest bumper
sticker and be moved to buy it. Yet the poem and
bumper sticker are not commercial speech because
people want to buy them. The commercial
motivation comes from an appreciation of the speech
product itself, not from commercial speech about the
product.
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In contrast, a print advertisement that
pictures the poem or bumper sticker would be
commercial speech because the advertisement is
trying to persuade people to buy the speech product.
If people appreciated the advertisement for its own
sake, they might simply tear it from the magazine
and display the ad itself rather than purchase the
speech product. For this reason, speech products
such as novels or computer software are not
commercial speech even though the creator seeks to
sell them for commercial gain.
Other Commentator Suggestions and Their
Deficiencies
The proposed audience impact model is
related to suggestions of several legal commentators.
Farber [1979] asserts that regulations concerning
speech should be examined to see if they relate to the
informational or contractual function of speech. The
former would be fully protected under the First
Amendment; the latter only protected as commercial
speech. Whelen [1987] provides a specific test for
this approach. He proposes that speech, which
contract law would hold establishes an express
warranty, would constitute commercial speech.
Though these suggestions are interesting, both appear
to provide an extremely narrow definition of
commercial speech. Speech can propose a
commercial transaction and influence people in their
capacity as consumers without making
representations that are sufficiently factual and
specific to constitute an express warranty of the
product.
In contrast to these narrow definitions of
commercial speech, some have suggested very broad
definitions. Alderman [1982] proposes that any
speech by a commercial entity be deemed
commercial speech. Woglom [1983] suggests simply
that if speech contains factual statements related to
the speaker's area of business expertise, it should be
deemed commercial. These broad definitions directly
contradict past Supreme Court holdings. In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti [1978], the
Supreme Court held that Massachusetts could not
prohibit political speech simply because it was
communicated by a business corporation. It stated
that the First Amendment also protects the rights of
listeners to receive political speech. In that case, the
speech in question was related to the speaker's area
of business expertise, so the Supreme Court has
effectively rejected both Alderman's and Woglom's
proposed definitions. The audience impact model
proposed here is consistent with First National Bank
of Boston because it evaluates the listener's interest
in the speech to determine whether the speech is
commercial or fully protected.
McGowan [1990, p. 401] proposes a
definition of commercial speech similar to that
derived from the audience impact model: "speech
that does no more than propose the sale of a specific
named good or service." This proposal goes beyond
Supreme Court precedent by requiring that a specific
good or service be named. McGowan's proposal also
is flawed because it fails to address implied
proposals for commercial transactions in which intent
of the speaker or effect on the audience clearly
establishes the commerciality of the message.
Similarly, Simon [1984-85] examines the
intended effect of the speech and whether the
resulting action (purchase) results in individual or
societal harm. Simon broadly defines commercial
speech to include false or misleading commercial
speech, contrary to repeated Supreme Court holdings
that such speech is outside First Amendment
protection. His proposal also suffers from its
exclusive focus on the intended effect, rather than
the likely actual impact the speech has on its
audience.
In contrast to these legal commentators,
suggestions from marketing scholars tend to be
multi-faceted and complex beyond usefulness. Heath
and Nelson [1983, 1985], suggest five factors should
be examined: (1) content, (2) purpose, (3) context
(e.g., level of political controversy), (4) audience,
and (5) channels. Cutler and Muehling [1989]
propose seven factors to determine whether the
speaker is likely a competitive advantage through the
speech: (1) topic, (2) identification of sponsor
including brand names and trademarks, (3) what
other industry members are doing, (4) whether the
campaign is deducted from taxes as a business
expense, (5) whether the sponsoring firm is dominant
in the industry, (6) media used for dissemination,
and (7) amount and percentage of advertising budget
devoted to the speech in question. When pressed by
Middleton [1991] for not relating their factors to the
criteria announced by the Supreme Court, Cutler and
Muehling [1991] suggested that their factors should
be used in addition to other information to help
determine the third (now discredited) Bolger criterion
of economic motivation.
The simplicity of Cutler and Muehling's idea
to focus on competitive advantage is marred by two
problems. First, when attempting to apply this
simple test, they derive four categories of speech that
are impossible to reconcile with the Supreme Court's
dichotomous characterization. Second, the
competitive impact of the speech is simply the wrong
criterion from a public policy perspective. By
examining whether speech proposes a commercial
transaction, the Supreme Court is suggesting
implicitly that consumer impact be analyzed.
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Examining consumer impact is also consistent with
current policy for regulating deceptive advertising.
Though the FTC does challenge advertising bans as
anticompetitive, it regulates advertising itself to see
if it is deceptive or unfair to consumers. Most courts
have interpreted section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to
allow only competitors, not consumers, to sue for
misleading advertising. However, the competitor
plaintiff must first prove that the ads have the
capacity to mislead consumers and only then may it
prove that it was likely to be injured [Petty and Kopp
1993].
The apparent record for number of factors to
be analyzed goes to a legal commentator rather than
one from marketing. Linn [1988] urges the balancing
of nine public policy rationales: (1) the likelihood of
false belief, (2) the seriousness of resulting injury,
(3) the concentration of the harm from the erroneous
statements, (4) the strength of the ideological
(non-commercial) motives for speaking, (5) the ease
of review, (6) the objective verifiability of the
message, (7) the strength of the speaker's motive
(likelihood of "chilling"), (8) the severity of
regulatory penalties, and (9) the likelihood the
penalties will be incorrectly applied to true speech.
Similarly, Posner [1986] suggests balancing the costs
with the benefits to determine what regulation is
appropriate. He suggests several factors to examine
in applying his test.
These factor-oriented approaches [Cutler and
Muehling 1989; Heath and Nelson 1985; Heath and
Nelson 1983; Linn 1988; Posner 1986] all suffer
from the same deficiency as the current Supreme
Court approach-they lack specificity and
predictability. These models tell both marketers and
the courts what factors to evaluate, but not how to
measure each factor, what value for each factor is
sufficient to indicate either fully protected or
commercial speech, or how to weigh each factor in
making an overall determination. Because individual
courts will evaluate and weigh each factor
differently, a speaker using these models cannot tell
whether its speech will be deemed fully protected.
Application of the Audience Impact Model
The true measure of this proposal's value is
whether it accurately predicts both past and future
court decisions. This model not only agrees with the
Supreme Court's decision in Bolger, but also
predicts two similar FTC cases. In National
Commission of Egg Nutrition v. FTC (N.C.E.N.)
[1977], the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the FTC holding that advertisements by a
trade association of egg producers were commercial
speech and false or misleading. Contrary to generally
accepted scientific thinking, the advertisements
claimed that consumption of eggs had not been
proven to be detrimental to health because of the
high cholesterol content of eggs. Similarly, in R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. [19881, the FTC challenged
advertising suggesting that the alleged deleterious
connection between smoking and heart disease has
not been proven scientifically. In all three of these
cases, the likely effect of these campaigns was to sell
more of the featured products.
The utility advocacy advertising cases
provide a challenge for any method of analysis
because decisions regarding the production of
electricity largely are made politically, not by the
free market process. Therefore, if people are misled
by the communications about electric power
production, they are misled as voters. They are not
misled into an incorrect purchase decision as
consumers because they do not "shop" for electricity
in the normal marketplace. For this reason, the
audience impact model would hold that speech
concerning the production of electric power should
be deemed fully protected and not commercial
speech. This result is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. In Consolidated Edison Co. of NY v.
Public Service Commission of NY [1980], the
Supreme Court held that utility company billing
inserts asserting the desirability of nuclear power
were political speech. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission of CA [19861, it held
that a newsletter commenting on pending legislation
also was political speech.
Consistent with these cases, the Supreme
Court also has held that the economic interest of the
speaker does not change what would otherwise be
fully protected speech into commercial speech. In
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti [1978], the
speech in question was opposition to a graduated
income tax. The speech was held to be fully
protected because of its value to the electorate. This
holding appears consistent with the proposed
audience impact model because people likely would
be influenced by this speech in their capacity as
voters, not as consumers of banking services.
Several interesting examples outside actual
Supreme Court cases can be used to illustrate the
application of the audience impact model. For
example, Linn [1988] suggests a possible advertising
campaign by a seller of artificial fur products
decrying the killing of living animals. This example,
like the Bolger, N.C.E.N., and R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. cases discussed previously, is a case in
which political speech is used to sell a product. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that advertising
that merely "links a product to a current public
debate" is still only commercial speech [Central
Hudson 1980, p. 562; Bolger 1983, p. 68]. Though
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the regulation of animal "harvesting" is a political
concern, the exact nature of the ads would determine
whether people are potentially influenced more in
their capacity as consumers (i.e., to buy fake furs) or
as members of the electorate (i.e., to support new
laws).
Similarly, "green" advertising appears likely
to be deemed commercial speech. Advertising
recyclable packaging does raise the debate about the
merits of recycling, but like the fake fur example,
any linking of public issues with a sales message to
buy a product is likely to influence audience
members first in their capacity as consumers.
Therefore such mixed messages likely are
commercial speech.
A tougher case would be a situation in which
a charitable organization dedicated to fighting AIDS
urges people to use condoms. The Audience Impact
model makes the controversial prediction that such
advocacy should be deemed commercial speech.
Even though the charity has no financial interest in
selling condoms, the impact on people is the same as
the Bolger case, in which the message sponsor did
have such a financial interest.
What if a charity offered a product as a
reward for a donation? An unrewarded solicitation
would be fully protected, but the question of whether
people are influenced in their capacity as consumers
or as benevolent citizens would depend in part on the
reward being offered. If people contribute to the
Easter Seals organization primarily to get stamps, the
Audience Impact Model would label an Easter Seals
solicitation as commercial speech. However, this
result seems unlikely given the relatively small
intrinsic value of the seals. Consumer evidence
would more likely find that people are motivated to
contribute to the charity, not purchase the stamps.
At some point, however, a charitable
solicitation that promised a reward would be found
to be commercial speech. Do people buy Girl Scout
cookies because they like the cookies or the
organization? Without actual survey evidence, this
answer is difficult to predict. In contrast, consumers
who buy light bulbs or trash bags from charitable
organizations may be primarily purchasing the
product and only incidentally contributing to the
organization. If that proves to be the case, then the
solicitations should be treated as commercial speech,
just as advertisements for those products.
A final example of not-for-profit business
organization would be a consumer product testing
organization that publishes its results (e.g.,
Consumer Reports). The effect on people reading
Consumer Reports may well be to purchase one of
the rated products, but the magazine is not
commercial speech because it is a speech product
and entitled to full protection.
A for-profit corporation might decide to use
the Consumer Reports ratings in its promotional
literature. At that point, the speech becomes
commercial because advertising is not a speech
product.
If Consumer Reports or some other
organization condemns a particular product, the
company may engage in public rebuttal to bolster
sales diminished by public controversy. When
consumer groups urged the boycott of tuna because
tuna fishing often killed dolphins, tuna companies
responded by changing and then touting their
dolphin-safe fishing methods. Similarly, General
Motors responded to the NBC filming of a GM truck
bursting into flames from an impact to its side by
announcing it had evidence that the demonstration
was "rigged."
In both situations, the exact response will
determine whether the speech is commercial or fully
protected. If a press conference is held solely to
present the new evidence without trying to persuade
consumers to buy the product, the likely impact
would appear to be on the public debate, not product
purchases. If the press conference included
exhortation to purchase the product, it might then
become commercial speech. Again, in close cases,
the speech, the documented intent behind the speech,
and the impact of the speech on the audience as
determined through testing could all be examined to
decide whether such mixed speech is fully protected
or commercial.
Linn [1988, p. 471-2] suggests another
example of a for profit company contributing to a
public debate: an insurance industry advertising
campaign decrying the high level of liability awards
and the resulting cost to consumers and business
[Woglom 1983]. Because the campaign urges tort
reform rather than additional insurance purchases, it
would be political speech under the audience impact
model. As discussed previously, this simple
resolution should dominate over other factors that the
Supreme Court has recently discounted, such as the
economic motive of the speaker, the mode of speech,
and paid-for advertising.
Similarly, in contrast to the typical "green"
advertising touting a brand as safe for the
environment discussed previously, if a company
advocates against regulation of certain aerosol
propellants used in its products, such speech might
be deemed fully protected. This could be true even
if the advertising mentioned brand names. To be
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fully protected, the primary impact of the advertising
must be to persuade citizens that such regulation is
not needed rather than persuade consumers to buy
the product. In this example, it is useful to examine
the political context of the message as well as the
message itself.
Corporations frequently sponsor public
service activities. For example, Philip Morris was
the principal sponsor of the National Archives
commemoration of the Bill of Rights. In the paid-for
television and print advertising, the Philip Morris
logo, company name, and names of its three
subsidiaries -- Kraft General Foods, Miller Brewing
Company, and Philip Morris USA -- appeared at the
end of the advertising [Klein and Greyser 1990b]. A
number of tobacco critics argued that Philip Morris
was attempting to use this campaign to reassert the
right to smoke and advertise tobacco products. It was
even suggested that this sponsorship violated the ban
on television advertising of cigarettes because the
company name was included in the advertising [Klein
and Greyser 1990a].
The audience impact model predicts that
Philip Morris's legal exposure was minimal. The Bill
of Rights sponsorship should be characterized as
fully protected speech. The advertising did not
mention any products beyond company names, it
only touted the significance of the Bill of Rights.
Unless careful audience impact testing reveals
otherwise, there is no reason to believe this
sponsorship would particularly influence people to
buy Philip Morris products.
Of course, to a small degree, any corporate
image advertising might be said to influence people
to buy more of the corporation's product, but this is
an indirect result. The primary effect is an attempt to
establish a favorable corporate image. No court has
held that identified corporate sponsorship of a
message is sufficient to make that speech
commercial. In fact, in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti [1978], the Supreme Court
virtually ignored the corporate sponsorship issue.
Of course, if corporate sponsorship is a
commercial sham, the audience impact model will
still find commercial speech. For example, when
Italian shoemaker Salvatore Ferragamo sponsored an
art exhibit featuring its own shoes, sales climbed
20% in a nearby Ferragamo shoe boutique
[Consumers Union 1992]. The impact on the
audience of this sponsorship appears commercial.
Conclusion
The desirability of a simple model for
distinguishing commercial from fully protected
speech is beyond question. The recent Supreme
Court decision in City of Cincinnati [1993] suggests
that the Court is trying to simplify its analysis by
emphasizing the importance of the "proposal of a
commercial transaction" test. The audience impact
model presented here is a practical application of this
test. It focuses on whether people are potentially
influenced more as consumers or in another capacity
by the speech in question. The model's usefulness to
both businesses and courts lies in not only its
simplicity, but also its ability to predict the results of
past Supreme Court cases.
This article has attempted to apply the
Audience Impact model to a number of different
types of speech to illustrate how the model would be
applied. However, none of these examples included
empirical evidence of the intent behind the speech
or, most importantly, the audience reaction to the
speech. Though the formulation of this model
appears promising, the development of such evidence
in real cases will ultimately determine the model's
usefulness and predictive ability.
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ENDNOTES
1. It is beyond the scope of this article to debate whether
commercial speech should be entitled to full First Amendment
protection, no First Amendment protection, or some
intermediate level of protection. Rather, I assume, without
endorsing, that the current Supreme Court approach of
distinguishing commercial speech from fully protected speech
will continue and offer a model to enable marketing managers
to make this distinction.
2. It is interesting to compare the 11 % reduction in lottery
messages held to be significant in Egde with the 3-4%
reduction in the "clutter" of newsracks found to be "minute"
and "paltry" in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc. [1993], issued only three months before Edge.
Reprinted by permission of the American Marketing Association.
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Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
in United States vs. X-Citement Video Inc., to
review a decision of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals holding unconstitutional two provisions of
the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act (PCASE) of 1977. In the 2-1 panel
ruling now under examination, the court of appeals
held that the First Amendment "mandates that a
statute prohibiting the distribution, shipping or
receipt of child pornography require as an element
knowledge of the minority of at least one of the
performers who engage in or portray the specified
conduct," but that the federal law neglected to so
stipulate.
That sabotage of the federal child
pornography law insulted Supreme Court precedents,
as the panel dissent highlighted. It also underscored
the prominence of philosophy, and personal
prejudice in the interpretation of the Constitution and
federal law by many judges, and thus the need for
the public and press to consider carefully all of a
president's judicial appointments.
The federal child pornography law prohibits
the knowing transportation, shipment, receipt or
distribution of visual pornographic depictions of
children, i.e., persons under the age of 18. In New
York vs. Ferber (1982), the Supreme Court
sustained a New York prohibition of child
pornography against First Amendment attack.
Writing for the court, Justice Byron White noted that
the prohibition was confined to the depiction of
minors in acts of sexual intercourse, sexual
bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals. He further
emphasized the trivial free speech value of child
pornography, but its acute detrimental effects on the
physiological, emotional and mental health of the
exploited children. The interest of the government in
preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of
children, Justice White lectured, is "of surpassing
importance."
The Supreme Court again addressed child
pornography in Osborne vs. Ohio (1990). At issue
was a state law criminalizing the possession of child
pornography where the defendant either knew the
sexual performers were youths or was recklessly
heedless of that fact. Proof of recklessness, the court
reasoned, plainly satisfied the constitutional
command of Ferber that criminal responsibility for
those who traffic in child pornography not be
imposed unless a defendant's wrongful purpose is
established.
The court of appeals in X-Citement Video
insisted that the federal anti-child pornography law
created strict criminal liability for distributors in
violation of the Ferber requirement that some type of
guilty knowledge be made an element of the offense.
Moreover, the appeals court concluded, any
correcting amendment to the federal statute must
require proof of a defendant's actual knowledge of
the underage status of sexual performers, to satisfy
the First Amendment. Otherwise, the appellate court
fretted, the magnificent benefits of sexually explicit
materials might be curbed because distributors,
sellers or receivers would be burdened with learning
the ages of the actors involved to insure against
criminal culpability.
The appeals court decision is wrongheaded
on several counts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
instructed subordinate federal tribunals to interpret
ambiguous federal statutes to avoid, not to invite,
constitutional collisions. Thus, Ferber lectured:
"When a federal court is dealing with a federal
statute challenged as over-broad, it should, of
course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional
problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting
construction." And in United States vs. Thirty-seven
Photographs (1971), the Supreme Court read into a
federal obscenity law procedural protections that
Congress had overlooked to save its constitutionality.
Whether the knowledge requirement of the
PCASE Act applied both to the contents of the
sexually explicit materials and to the ages of the
performers was debatable. The court of appeals
defied the many unambiguous teachings of the
Supreme Court in resolving the statutory ambiguity
to create a constitutional conflict.
As the dissent pointed out, Congress often
enacts criminal prohibitions that neglect to specify
the mental states of the defendant that must be
proven for each element of the offense, and courts
routinely shore up the omissions by reasonably
inferring a legislative intent to require some type of
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guilty knowledge. Congress is generally presumed to
embrace the teaching of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in "The Common Law": "A law which
punishes conduct which would not be blame-worthy
in the average member of the community would be
too severe for that community to bear."
The panel majority in X-Citement Video
seemed intent on wrecking the PCASE because of
enthrallment with First Amendment claims. That
suspicion is substantiated by the majority's gratuitous
advice that a requirement of actual knowledge of
underage was indispensable to the constitutionality of
the Act, despite the Supreme Court's refusal to rule
out reckless or negligent ignorance of youth as
constitutionally adequate. Instead of discharging its
duty to heed Supreme Court precedents, the majority
blithely charted its own course.
It speaks volumes concerning the importance
of philosophy and predilections to judicial rulings
that the panel majority comprised appointees of
President Jimmy Carter (William Canby) and
President George Bush (Ferdinand Fernandez),
whereas the dissent was authored by an appointee of
President Ronald Reagan (Alex Kozinski).
Only a tiny fraction of federal appellate
decisions are reviewed annually by the Supreme
Court, and thus the influence of appellate judges in
shaping constitutional and statutory law is strong.
Their appointments deserve serious scrutiny and
evaluation by the media and public, not the yawning
indifference that at present prevails.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance writer
specializing in legal issues.
Reprinted from The Washington Times.
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COURT TO TAKE ON MALT LIQUOR CASE
Proprietary to the United Press International 1994
June 13, 1994, Monday, BC cycle
Michael Kirkland
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
review a government ban on labels that list the
alcohol content of malt liquor and some beers, but
the government contends such labels could result in
"strength wars," with breweries using the
information to entice more customers.
In a Justice Department brief filed with the
Supreme Court, the administration cited
congressional passage of the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act after the 21st Amendment
repealed Prohibition.
The act included restrictions on the
disclosure of alcohol content on malt beverages in
order to curb the "strength wars" among brewers,
who tried to woo customers with claims that their
malt product was more powerful than their
competitors'.
In 1987, the Adolph Coors Co. asked the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for
approval of labels and advertisements for its Coors
and Coors Light brand beer that would list the
alcoholic content.
The ATF denied the request and
Colorado-based Coors sued, charging that the
prohibitions of alcohol content in ads and on labels
violated the free speech provisions of the First
Amendment.
In the first hearing in U.S. District Court in
Denver, the Bush administration's Treasury and
Justice departments conceded that the bans were
unconstitutional.
In an unusual move, however, the
Democratic-controlled House of Representatives
intervened, in order to defend the constitutionality of
the statute.
The House and Coors each filed a cross
motion, and Coors eventually won, with the judge
ruling the ban on alcohol content in ads and on
labels was unconstitutional.
The 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, citing a substantial consumer interest at
stake, and sent the case back to district court.
This time, on the eve of the 1992 election
and a Democratic victory, Justice Department
lawyers offered evidence they said proved breweries
were boasting about the "punch" of their malt
liquors, as opposed to other types of beer.
The district court ruled that the ban on
alcohol content in ads was constitutional, but the ban
on labels was unconstitutional. The judge said
consumers could use the listed alcohol content to
limit their intake.
Another panel on the 10th Circuit affirmed
in August 1993, and the Clinton administration
Justice Department asked the Supreme Court for
review.
Argument in the case will probably be heard
by the justices early next year. (No. 93-1631, Lloyd
Bentsen et al vs. Adolph Coors Co.)
Reprinted with the permission of United Press
International, Inc.
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POLITICAL ADS IN TRANSIT STATIONS
TO BE DECIDED BY SUPREME COURT
Copyright 1994 Information Access Co., a division of Ziff Communications Co.
Business Publishers, Inc
Urban Transport News, Vol 22, No. 12
June 9, 1994
The rights of transit agencies to restrict
political advertising could be diminished by a case
now pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Two
weeks ago, the Supreme Court agreed to decide
whether Amtrak can reject certain political messages
from its train stations. The case involves a New
York City artist who tried to rent a billboard in
Pennsylvania Station for his political art.
A main issue is whether Amtrak is defined
as a private corporation not bound by the First
Amendment or whether it is a government entity. A
federal district judge ruled that Amtrak was a
government entity but a federal appeals court ruled
that it was a private corporation. Many urban transit
agencies have elements of both a corporation and a
government entity. The Port Authority Trans
Hudson, for example, is both a public commuter rail
agency and landlord of the World Trade Center.
If the Supreme Court rules that Amtrak is a
government entity and must accept the ads, the
ruling might also lessen transit agencies' discretion
in accepting or rejecting political ads. Chip Bishop,
spokesman for the American Public Transit
Association, said, "Most transit systems set their
own criteria on whether to accept these ads. By and
large, it's a local decision."
Content Neutral Ads Preferred
Pat Lambe, spokesman for the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority said, "In
general, our policy on accepting ads is that they must
be content neutral and not offensive." Emotionally
charged political ads that advocate a controversial
position are rejected.
The New York artist, Michael Lebron,
whose political murals have appeared in subway
stations, signed a two-month lease two years ago to
display his art on Pennsylvania Station's prime
display space, a 103-foot-wide billboard called the
Spectacular. He was told obscenity or scenes of
violence were prohibited. When he submitted a
photograph of his proposed display - a montage with
messages attacking Coors Brewing Company for
supporting conservative causes - he was told by an
Amtrak vice president that political advertising was
prohibited.
Sue Martin, an Amtrak spokesman, refused
to comment.
A similar case last December over ads
promoting condom use ended in a defeat for public
transit agencies that reject the ads. A federal judge
in Boston ruled a Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority policy banning ads that are "racy" was
unconstitutional.
Lebron's mural for Pennsylvania Station is
a parody of a Coors beer advertisement. Coors
promotes its beer with the slogan, "It's the right beer
now." Lebron's mural says, "Is it the right's beer
now?" One photographic image shows a beer can
flying at a family of Nicaraguan villagers, a
reference to the Coors family's support for the
Contra rebels during the Nicaraguan civil war.
Lebron agreed to pay $16,500 a month to
rent the space. He sued Amtrak early last year and
won in federal district court. The court ruled Amtrak
violated Lebron's First Amendment rights to express
his political viewpoint. The federal judge ordered
Amtrak to display the mural.
Corporations Have More Choice
Last December, a U.S. Court of Appeals
overturned the ruling in a 2-to-1 decision. Amtrak
was a corporation and not a "state actor," the appeals
court said. The constitutional limits on government
restrictions do not apply to private corporations.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Lebron
argues that Amtrak is a government entity. It was
created by the federal government in 1970,
guaranteed its loans, owns its preferred stock and
holds mortgages on its major properties, including
Penn Station. In lower court employment decisions,
Amtrak was consistently held to be a private
corporation. But Lebron's lawyer argues that the
constitutional issue here makes the case different.
Employment issues are handled by local managers.
A policy against political advertising must be
approved by Amtrak's board, which would mean the
presidentially-appointed board was acting like a
government entity, Lebron argues.
The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear the
case next fall. If the justices rule the First
Amendment applies, the case is likely to be sent
back to the appeals court to decide whether Amtrak's
policy is unconstitutional.
o 1994 Business Publishers, Inc. Reprinted with the express
permission of Business Publishers, Inc., 951 Pershing Drive, Silver
Spring, MD 20910, (301) 587-6300 from Urban Transport News,
Vol. 22, No. 12, June 9, 1994, pp. 92-93.
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HIGH COURT TO RULE ON AMTRAK BAN ON POLITICAL SIGN
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
May 24, 1994, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final
Linda Greenhouse, Special to The New York Times
Accepting an appeal from an East Village
artist who tried to rent a billboard in Pennsylvania
Station for his political art, the Supreme Court
agreed today to decide whether Amtrak can exclude
particular political messages from its train stations.
The Justices will decide whether Amtrak is
a private corporation that is not bound by the
Constitution, as a Federal appeals court ruled in
dismissing the artist's suit five months ago, or
whether it functions as a Government entity that
must abide by the First Amendment, as a Federal
District Judge initially held.
The artist, Michael A. Lebron, whose
political murals have appeared in subway stations
here and in New York, signed a two-month lease
two years ago to display his art on Pennsylvania
Station's prime display space, a curved, lighted,
103-foot-wide billboard called the Spectacular. He
was told that obscenity or depictions of violence
were off-limits.
When he submitted a color photograph of
the work he proposed to display, a photo montage
with inscriptions that attacked the Coors Brewing
Company for its support of conservative causes, he
was told by an Amtrak vice president that political
advertising was also unacceptable.
Mr. Lebron's mural is a parody of a Coors
beer advertisement. While Coors advertises its light
beer with the slogan, "It's the right beer now," Mr.
Lebron's mural asks: "Is it the right's beer now?"
Mr. Lebron, who had agreed to pay $16,500
a month to rent the space, sued Amtrak early last
year and won before Judge Pierre N. Leval of
Federal District Court, who found that Amtrak had
unconstitutionally discriminated against Mr. Lebron's
political viewpoint. Judge Leval ordered Amtrak to
display the mural.
But the United States Court of Appeal
overturned that ruling in December finding that
because Amtrak was not a "state actor," the First
Amendment did not apply. The Constitution imposes
limits on the behavior of Government, not of private
parties.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr.
Lebron is arguing that Amtrak is essentially a
creature of the Federal Government, which not only
created Amtrak in 1970 but guaranteed its loans,
owns all its preferred stock, and holds the mortgages
on its major properties, including Penn Station.
Amtrak also has the right to condemn private
property through the power of eminent domain and
is exempt from state and local taxes.
If the Justices agree after they hear the case
next fall that the First Amendment applies, they are
likely to send the case back to the appeals court with
instructions to decide whether Amtrak's policy is
unconstitutional.
Copyright c 1994 by The New York Times
Company. Reprinted by permission.
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93-1631 BENTSEN v. ADOLPH COORS CO.
Malt beverage labels-Alcohol content-First
Amendment.
Ruling below (CA 10, 2 F.3d 355, 62 LW
2143):
Provision in 1935 Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act that prohibits statements of alcohol con-
tent on malt beverage labels unless required by
state law, 27 USC 205(e)(2), restrains commer-
cial speech in violation of First Amendment.
Question presented: Does Section 5(e)(2) of
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 USC
205(e)(2), which prohibits statements of alcohol
content on labels of malt beverage containers
unless such statements are required by state law,
violate First Amendment?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/15/94, by Drew
S. Days III, Sol. Gen., Frank W. Hunger, Asst.
Atty. Gen., Edwin S. Kneedler, Dpty. Sol. Gen.,
and Richard H. Seamon, Asst. to Sol. Gen.
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ADOLPH COORS COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
LLOYD BENTSEN,* in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury;
and STEVE HIGGINS, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Defendants-Appellants, and SPEAKER AND BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Intervenor-Defendant.
* Lloyd Bentsen is substituted for Nicholas Brady pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).
ADOLPH COORS CO. v. BENTSEN
No. 92-1348
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
2 F.3d 355; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21202; 21 Media L. Rep. 2022
August 23, 1993, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Certiorari Granted June 13, 1994, Reported at: 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4632.
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLORADO (D.C. No. 87-Z-977).
COUNSEL: John S. Koppel (Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant Attorney General, and Stuart E. Schiffer, Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Michael J. Norton, United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado; and Michael Jay Singer, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs), Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the Defendants-Appellants.
K. Preston Oade (Jim M. Hansen, of Bradley, Campbell, Carney & Madsen, Professional Corporation,
Golden, Colorado, with him on the brief), of Bradley, Campbell, Carney & Madsen, Professional
Corporation, Golden, Colorado, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
JUDGES: Before TACHA and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge."
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Appellants (collectively referred to as the
"Government") appeal a district order declaring the
portion of 27 U.S.C. 205 (e)(2) which prohibits
statements of alcohol content on malt beverage labels
to be an unconstitutional restraint on commercial
speech in violation of the First Amendment. The
Government also appeals the court's order enjoining
the Government from enforcing that provision. We
exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and
affirm.
I. Background
Congress enacted the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act ("Act"), 27 U.S.C. 201-211, in 1935 after the
repeal of Prohibition. The Act contains
comprehensive regulations of the alcoholic beverage
industry, including provisions that were intended to
remedy industry practices which Congress had
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determined were unfair, deceptive, and harmful to
both competitors and consumers. Two such
provisions prohibit statements of alcohol content on
malt beverage' labels and advertisements unless such
disclosures are required by state law. 27 U.S.C.
205(e)(2), (f)(2).1
In 1987, Adolph Coors Co. ("Coors")
sought the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms's approval for proposed labels and
advertisements that disclosed the alcohol content of
its malt beverages. The bureau denied the request
pursuant to 205(e)(2) and (f)(2). Coors then brought
this action to challenge the decision, arguing that the
provisions impose an unconstitutional restraint on
commercial speech in violation of the First
Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment
for Coors and the Government appealed. On appeal,
we evaluated the provisions under the four-part test
for restrictions on commercial speech set forth in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 65
L. Ed. 2d 341, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980):
At the outset, we must determine whether
the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.
Id. at 566.
Applying the first two parts of the test, we concluded
that the proposed labels and advertisements were
commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment and that the Government had asserted a
legitimate and substantial interest in preventing
strength wars among malt beverage brewers. See
Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543,
1547-49 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Coors I"). We reversed
and remanded, however, holding that there were
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
statutory prohibitions directly advance the
Government's interest in preventing strength wars
and whether there is a reasonable fit between the
Government's asserted interest and the complete
prohibitions imposed by the statute. See id. at 1554.
After conducting a trial on remand, the
district court held that the relevant portion of
205(f)(2) is constitutional, but that the portion of
205(e)(2) which prohibits statements of alcohol
content on malt beverage labels imposes an
unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech in
violation of the First Amendment because it neither
directly advances nor reasonably fits the goal of
preventing strength wars. The Government now
appeals the district court's judgment with respect to
205(e)(2) and we limit our review to that provision.
II. Discussion
The Government has the burden of proving
that the labeling prohibition of 205(e)(2) directly
advances its interest in preventing strength wars.
We stated in Coors I that the Central Hudson test
requires "an immediate connection between the
prohibition and the government's asserted end. If the
means-end connection is tenuous or highly
speculative, the regulation cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny." 944 F.2d at 1549 (internal
quotations omitted). The Government challenges this
standard on appeal and, relying on Posadas de Puerto
Rico Association v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 92
L. Ed. 2d 266, 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986), argues that
the Government need only demonstrate that Congress
reasonably believed that the statutory prohibition
would further its objective when it enacted the
labeling restriction. See id. at 341-42.
Since the Government filed its appellate
brief, however, the Supreme Court has decided
Edenfield v. Fane, 123 L. Ed. 2d 543, 113 S. Ct.
1792 (1993), in which it articulates a standard that is
consistent with our pronouncements in Coors I and
much stricter than the "reasonably believed" standard
the Government would have us adopt. In Edenfield,
the Court stated that, under this third prong of the
Central Hudson test, courts must determine "whether
the challenged regulation advances [the
government's] interests in a direct and material
way." 113 S. Ct. at 1798. It went on to say that the
party restricting commercial speech carries the
burden of justifying the restriction and that "this
burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or
conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that
its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree." Id. at 1800. This burden also applies to
prophylactic regulations like the challenged
prohibition in 205(e)(2) where the Government
prohibits conduct at the outset rather than waiting
until harm has occurred. Id. at 1803 (prophylactic
ban "in no way relieves the State of the obligation to
demonstrate that it is regulating speech in order to
address what is in fact a serious problem and that the
preventative measure it proposes will contribute in a
material way to solving that problem").
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The Government asserts that the prohibition
on speech contained in 205(e)(2) was imposed to
prevent strength wars among malt beverage
manufacturers. This assertion is supported by the
Act's legislative history which contains testimony
"that labels displaying alcohol content resulted in a
strength war wherein producers competed for market
share by putting increasing amounts of alcohol in
their beer." Coors I, 944 F.2d at 1548. There was
also hearing testimony "that not disclosing the
alcohol content on malt beverages would relieve
marketplace pressures to produce beer on the basis
of alcohol content, resulting over the long term in
beers with a lower alcohol content." Id. The
Government argues that, despite changes in the malt
beverage industry and market since 1935, 205(e)(2)
directly advances its crusade against the continuing
danger of strength wars. After reviewing the record,
we conclude that, although the Government's interest
in preventing strength wars is legitimate and is
within its regulatory authority, the prohibition in
205(e)(2) does not advance this interest in a direct
and material way.
The Government relies primarily on
anecdotal evidence that malt beverage manufacturers
already are competing and advertising on the basis of
alcohol strength in the malt liquor sector of the
market.' The record contains evidence that
consumers who prefer malt liquor do so primarily
because of its higher alcohol content and that a
number of manufacturers have tried to advertise malt
liquor--in violation of the regulations--by using
descriptive terms such as "power," "strong
character," "dynamite," and "bull" to tout its alcohol
strength. On the basis of this evidence, the
Government makes an inferential and conclusory
argument that the "experience of the malt liquor
industry establishes the continuing validity of the
statutory scheme" as applied to all malt beverages as
well as "the very real danger of strength wars if the
labeling ban is struck down."
This argument is unavailing. Although the
evidence may support the Government's assertion
that there is a continuing threat of strength wars
which it aims to prevent, Coors does not contest
either the existence of such a threat or the
Government's interest in preventing strength wars.
The critical question is whether the evidence shows
the required relationship between the labeling
prohibition that Coors is challenging and the threat
of strength wars. Coors is challenging the prohibition
on factual statements regarding the percentage of
alcohol by volume rather than the prohibition on the
sort of descriptive terms that have been used in the
malt liquor sector.' The Government simply has not
shown a relationship between the publication of such
factual information and strength wars.
The Government's argument is further
undermined by the absence of any record evidence
indicating that there are strength wars in states or
other countries where alcohol content labeling is
already required. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800
(noting lack of anecdotal evidence from states that do
not impose similar restrictions). In fact, there is
uncontroverted evidence that brewers in the United
States have no intention of increasing alcohol
strength, regardless of labeling regulations, because
the vast majority of consumers in the United States
value taste and lower calories--both of which are
adversely affected by increased alcohol strength.
Finally, the Government asserts that Coors
is challenging the labeling restrictions because of its
desire to counter a consumer perception that its malt
beverages contain less alcohol than competing
brands. This assertion, however, does not show
directly, or even imply, that Coors would engage in
a strength war if it were able to disclose the alcohol
content of its malt beverages on their labels. In fact,
the opposite inference is more plausible--if Coors
could overcome the misperception by simply
publishing the percentage of alcohol content on the
label, it would have no incentive to produce stronger
beverages.
We find that the Government has offered no
evidence to indicate that the appearance of factual
statements of alcohol content on malt beverage labels
would lead to strength wars or that their continued
prohibition helps to prevent strength wars. Instead,
it has offered only inferential arguments that are
based on mere speculation and conjecture and fails to
show that the prohibition advances the Government's
interest in a direct and material way." We therefore
hold that the portion of 27 U.S.C. 205(e)(2) which
prohibits statements of alcohol content on malt
beverage labels imposes an unconstitutional restraint
on commercial speech in violation of the First
Amendment.
AFFIRMED.
** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District
Judge, United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, sitting by designation.
ENDNOTES
1. "Malt beverage" is defined at 27 C.F.R. 7.10.
2. Section 205 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
business as a distiller, brewer, rectifier, blender, or
other producer, or as an importer or wholesaler, of
distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages.. directly or
indirectly or through an affiliate:
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test, we need not proceed to the fourth part to determnine
whether there is a reasonable fit between the prohibition and
(e) Labeling the Government's interest.
To sell or ship or deliver for sale or shipment, or
otherwise introduce in interstate or foreign commerce,
or to receive therein, or to remove from customs
custody for consumption, any distilled spirits, wine, or
malt beverages in bottles unless such products are
bottled, packaged, and labeled in conformity with such
regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, with respect to packaging, marking, branding,
and labeling and size and fill of container . . . (2) as
will provide the consumer with adequate information as
to the identity and quality of the products, the alcoholic
content thereof (except that statements of, or statements
likely to be considered as statements of, alcoholic
content of malt beverages are prohibited unless required
by State law . . .
(f) Advertising
To publish or disseminate or cause to be published or
disseminated by radio broadcast, or in any newspaper,
periodical or other publication or by any sign or outdoor
advertisement or any other printed or graphic matter,
any advertisement of distilled spirits, wine, or malt
beverages, if such advertisement is in, or is calculated
to induce sales in, interstate or foreign commerce, or is
disseminated by mail, unless such advertisement is in
conformity with such regulations, to be prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury, . . . (2) as will provide
the consumer with adequate information as to the
identity and quality of the products advertised, the
alcoholic content thereof (except the statements of, or
statements likely to be considered as statements of,
alcoholic content of malt beverages and wines are
prohibited). . . .
27 U.S.C. 205 (emphasis added).
3. The parties do not dispute that the labeling of malt
beverages' alcohol content is protected commercial speech
under the first part of the Central Hudson test or that the
Government has a substantial interest in preventing strength
wars under the second part.
4. "Malt liquor" is the term used to designate those malt
beverages with the highest alcohol content, whereas light beer
and non-alcoholic beer are malt beverages containing reduced
alcohol content. Malt liquors represent approximately three
percent of the malt beverage market.
5. The Act's implementing regulations distinguish these two
types of statements. Coors is challenging the type of
restriction contained in 27 C.F.R. 7.26(a) which provides that
"the alcoholic content and the percentage and quantity of the
original extract shall not be stated unless required by State
law." Coors is not challenging 7.29(f), which provides that
"labels shall not contain the words 'strong', 'full strength',
'extra strength'.. .or similar words or statements, likely to be
considered as statements of alcoholic content." Nor does it
challenge 7.29(g), which provides that "labels shall not
contain any statements, designs, or devices whether in the
form of numerals, letters, characters, figures, or otherwise,
which are likely to be considered as statements of alcoholic
content."
6. Because we conclude that the Government has failed to
satisfy its burden under the third part of the Central Hudson
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93-1525 LEBRON v. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORP.
Freedom of speech-Amtrak's ban on display of
political messages in Penn Station.
Ruling below (CA 2, 12 F.3d 388, 62 LW
2423):
Amtrak's refusal to rent train station billboard
for artist's display of political advertisement is
not government action and, therefore, does not
violate First Amendment.
Questions presented: (1) Did court of appeals
err in holding, contrary to at least four other
circuits, that higher degree of state involvement
with private entity must be shown to establish
state action for First Amendment claims than for
sex and race discrimination claims? (2) Did court
of appeals err in holding that Amtrak's asserted
policy barring display of political advertising
messages in Pennsylvania Station, New York,
was not state action, when (a) United States
created Amtrak, endowed it with governmental
powers, owns all its voting stock, and appoints all
members of its board; (b) U.S.-appointed board
approved advertising policy challenged here; (c)
United States keeps Amtrak afloat every year by
subsidizing its losses; and (d) Pennsylvania Sta-
tion was purchased for Amtrak by United States
and is shared with several other governmental
entities?
Petition for certiorari filed 3/28/94, by David
D. Cole, and Center for Constitutional Rights,
both of Washington, D.C., and R. Bruce Rich,
Gloria C. Phares, Bernardette M. McCann Ez-
ring, Jonathan Bloom, and Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, all of New York, N.Y.
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MICHAEL A. LEBRON, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK), Defendant-Appellant,
TRANSPORTATION DISPLAYS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Counter-Claimant.
LEBRON v. AMTRAK
Docket No. 93-7127
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
12 F.3d 388; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 33711
April 27, 1993, Argued
December 27, 1993, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Defendant-appellant National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) appeals from a
judgment entered February 11, 1993 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Pierre N. Leval, then-District Judge, that required Amtrak and defendant-counter-claimant
Transportation Displays, Incorporated to display a political advertisement prepared by
plaintiff-counter-defendant-appellee Michael A. Lebron on a large billboard known as the Penn Station
Spectacular. The district court ruled that Amtrak was a governmental actor, and had violated the First
Amendment by refusing to display Lebron's advertisement pursuant to a contract leasing the Spectacular to
Lebron for the months of January and February 1993.
DISPOSITION: We reverse.
COUNSEL: KEVIN T. BAINE, Washington, D.C. (Nicole K. Seligman, Steven M. Farina, Williams &
Connolly, Washington, D.C., William G. Ballaine, Mark S. Landman, Siff Rosen P.C., New York, New
York, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.
DAVID D. COLE, Washington, D.C. (Center for Constitutional Rights, Washington D.C., R. Bruce Rich,
Gloria C. Phares, Robin E. Silverman, Bernadette M. McCann Ezring, Jonathan Bloom, Weil, Gotshal &
Manges, New York, New York, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGES: Before: LUMBARD, NEWMAN*, and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges. Chief Judge Newman dissents
in a separate opinion.
OPINION BY: MAHONEY, Circuit Judge
Defendant-appellant National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) ("Amtrak") appeals
from a judgment entered February 11, 1993 in the
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Pierre N. Leval, then-District
Judge.** The judgment of the district court enjoined
Amtrak and an advertising agency that performs
services for Amtrak, defendant-counterclaimant
Transportation Displays, Incorporated ("TDI"), to
display a political advertisement prepared by
plaintiff-counter-defendant-appellee Michael A.
Lebron on a large billboard known as the
Spectacular in New York City's Pennsylvania Station
("Penn Station"). Lebron had entered into a contract
with TDI to lease the Spectacular for January and
February 1993.
The district court ruled that because of the
pervasive involvement of the federal government in
Amtrak's structure and operations, Amtrak's conduct
in controlling speech on its billboards must be
deemed governmental, rather than private, in nature,
and that Amtrak had violated the First Amendment
by refusing to display Lebron's advertisement.
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Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak),
811 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
We conclude that Amtrak is not a
governmental actor subject to the strictures of the
First Amendment, and accordingly reverse.
Background
In August 1991, Lebron, an artist who
creates billboard displays (frequently involving
commentary on public issues), first contacted TDI,
which manages the leasing of many of Amtrak's
billboards, about contracting for billboard space in
Penn Station. The Spectacular, a curved back-lit
display space approximately 103 feet wide by ten
feet high, dominates the west wall of the rotunda on
the upper level of Penn Station where thousands of
passengers pass each day. Lebron and TDI
eventually agreed that Lebron would pay $16,500
per month to rent the Spectacular for January and
February 1993. On November 30, 1992, Lebron and
TDI signed an agreement (the "Lease") to that effect.
In negotiating the Lease, Lebron dealt
primarily with William B. Schwartz, a TDI account
executive, who informed Lebron that displays for the
Spectacular containing obscenity or violence were
unacceptable. Schwartz asked Lebron about the
content of the advertisement that Lebron intended for
the Spectacular, but Lebron declined to disclose it,
explaining that while his work was generally
political, he wanted to keep the specific nature of his
advertisement for the Spectacular confidential prior
to its display. Schwartz did not then suggest that
there might be a problem with political
advertisements on the Spectacular.
Although Amtrak authorized TDI to manage
the leasing of Amtrak's billboard space, Amtrak at
all times retained the right to approve or reject all
advertising copy that would appear on its billboards.
(In practice, Amtrak only reviewed displays that
were to appear on the Spectacular.) Thus, the Lease
contained the following language:
All advertising copy is subject to approval
of TDI and [Amtrak] as to character, text,
illustration, design and operation.
If for any cause beyond its control TDI shall
cease to have the right to continue the
advertising covered by this contract, or if
[Amtrak] should deem such advertising
objectionable for any reason, TDI shall have
the right to terminate the contract and
discontinue the service without notice.
On December 2, 1992, Lebron submitted a
color photocopy of the work he intended to display
on the Spectacular to TDI, which TDI promptly
forwarded to Amtrak. Lebron characterizes the
advertisement as "an allegory about the destructive
influence of a powerful, urban, materialistic and
individualistic culture on rural, community based,
family-oriented and religious cultures." The district
court described it as follows:
The work is a photomontage, accompanied
by considerable text. Taking off on a widely
circulated Coors beer advertisement which
proclaims Coors to be the "Right Beer,"
Lebron's piece is captioned "Is it the Right's
Beer Now?" It includes photographic images
of convivial drinkers of Coors beer,
juxtaposed with a Nicaraguan village scene
in which peasants are menaced by a can of
Coors that hurtles towards them, leaving
behind a tail of fire, as if it were a missile.
The accompanying text, appearing on either
end of the montage, criticizes the Coors
family for its support of right-wing causes,
particularly the contras in Nicaragua. Again
taking off on Coors' advertising which uses
the slogan of "Silver Bullet" for its beer
cans, the text proclaims that Coors is "The
Silver Bullet that aims The Far Right's
political agenda at the heart of America."
811 F. Supp. at 995.
Anthony DeAngelo, Amtrak's vice president
for real estate and operations development, viewed
the photocopy and disapproved the display of
Lebron's advertisement on the Spectacular. In a
letter dated December 23, 1992, Amtrak notified
TDI of its rejection, stating that "Amtrak's policy is
that it will not allow political advertising on the
Spectacualar advertising sign."
Lebron then commenced this action against
Amtrak and TDI, claiming violations of his First and
Fifth Amendment rights as well as his contractual
rights under the Lease. He sought equitable relief to
compel Amtrak and TDI to display his ad on the
Spectacular, or alternatively, damages for breach of
the Lease. After expedited discovery and a trial on
documentary submissions, the district court ruled
that "in rejecting [Lebron's] contract to display his
art on its billboard Amtrak was engaged in
governmental action and ... the standards employed
by Amtrak in rejecting his work violated its
obligations under the First Amendment." 811 F.
Supp. at 1005. In view of this conclusion, the district
court did not reach Lebron's contractual claim. Id.
at 1005 n.5. Judgment was entered enjoining Amtrak
and TDI to display Lebron's advertisement on the
Spectacular "for two months beginning on the date
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that follows by six (6) business days the denial or
expiration of any stay of [the district court's]
judgment by the highest court having jurisdiction to
issue such a stay."
Amtrak applied to the district court for a
stay of its judgment pending appeal to this court.
The district court denied the application, but
"permitted delay in compliance with the judgment"
for fourteen days to allow an application for a stay
to this court, while recommending against the grant
of any such application.
This appeal followed. In response to a
motion by Amtrak, this court stayed the execution of
the district court's judgment pending appeal and
expedited the appeal.
Discussion
The First Amendment's directive "that
'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press' is a restraint on
government action, not that of private persons."
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772, 93 S.
Ct. 2080 (1973) (plurality opinion) (citing Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, 96
L. Ed. 1068, 72 S. Ct. 813 (1952)). Thus, in
considering Lebron's claim that Amtrak violated his
right to free speech, the threshold inquiry is whether
Amtrak's refusal to run Lebron's advertisement on
the Spectacular constitutes government action.
Government action is most readily found
when the conduct at issue is performed by a
government entity. However, that is not the case
here. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (the
"Act"), 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1988) et seq., created
Amtrak as a private, for-profit corporation under the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act. See
45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). This legislation rejected
earlier suggestions that the nation's passenger rail
service be nationalized. See Laurence E. Tobey,
Costs, Benefits, and the Future of Amtrak, 15
Transp. L.J. 245, 252-53 (1987). Accordingly, the
Act specifies that Amtrak is "not . . . an agency,
instrumentality, authority, or entity, or establishment
of the United States Government." § 541; see also
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison T. & S.
F. Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 454-55, 84 L. Ed. 2d
432, 105 S. Ct. 1441 (1985).
The government action inquiry is more
difficult when the challenged conduct is performed
not by the government itself, but by a private entity.
The Supreme Court has articulated a variety of
approaches for discerning the presence of
government action in the activities of private entities.
See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 73 L.
Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982) (private conduct
deemed government action when government coerces
or significantly encourages that conduct); Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-59, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 185, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (private entity
may be deemed government actor when performing
role traditionally performed exclusively by
government); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct. 449
(1974) (private action deemed governmental when
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself"); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45,
81 S. Ct. 856 (1961) (private action deemed
governmental when the government "has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [a private entity] that it must be recognized as
a joint participant in the challenged activity").'
As the Supreme Court has noted,
"formulating an infallible test" of government action
is an "'impossible task."' Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 378, 18 L. Ed. 2d 830, 87 S. Ct. 1627
(1967) (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 722). Rather,
"only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance."
Burton, 365 U.S. at 722.
In this case, the district court concluded that
"based on examination of the federal government's
deep and controlling entwinement in Amtrak's
structure and operation, . . . when Amtrak
undertakes to control the content of speech on its
billboards, its conduct must be deemed governmental
rather than private." 811 F. Supp. at 997.
Supporting this assessment, the district court
described Amtrak as "a corporation whose directors
are appointed by the President, whose operations are
financed by the federal government, and whose
properties, in major part, are mortgaged to the
federal government." Id. at 998.
We need not reiterate the details underlying
this description, see id. at 997-98 and nn. 3-8,
because we do not take issue with this aspect of the
district court's opinion, but rather with the legal
conclusion that is derived from it. As the district
court pointed out, there are "a number of cases in
which discharged employees charged either Amtrak
or the similarly structured Consolidated Rail
Corporation ('Conrail') with unconstitutional
governmental action . . . [in which] the courts held
that Amtrak's (or Conrail's) actions in dealing with
its employees were not deemed to be governmental
action." Id. at 999 (collecting cases).
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One of these cases was Myron v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 752 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1985). In that case, we held that:
Despite federal funding, regulation, stock
ownership and representation on the board
of directors, there is nothing resembling
federal supervision of day-to-day activities.
In sum, we conclude that despite an
obviously close relationship, the federal
government has not "so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence" with
Conrail that the latter's personnel decisions
can be considered federal action. Id. at
55-56 (footnote omitted) (quoting Burton,
365 U.S. at 725).
The district court distinguished Myron and the
similar precedents cited by the district court as
follows:
The fact that Amtrak is considered a private
employer in administering its employment of
personnel does not mean it will be deemed
private when it regulates speech. Whether
conduct of a particular entity will be deemed
governmental action can vary with the type
of action at issue. As Judge Friendly
explained in Wahba v. New York
University, 492 F.2d 96, 100 [(2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1972)], "we do
not find decisions dealing with one form of
state involvement and a particular provision
of the Bill of Rights at all determinative in
passing upon claims concerning different
forms of governmental involvement and
other constitutional guarantees." See also
Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d
397, 404 (2d Cir. 1975).
811 F. Supp. at 999 (footnote omitted).
We are not persuaded by this analysis.
Myron addressed the "government action" issue in
the specific context of a "claim that Conrail violated
[Myron's] First and Fifth Amendment rights by
discharging him for representing various people with
interests adverse to Conrail." 752 F.2d at 54. We
therefore decline to regard Myron as a precedent
confined to employee matters that does not provide
strong guidance, if not controlling authority, for our
decision in this First Amendment case.
Wahba also involved an assertion of First
Amendment claims, but we were nonetheless "unable
to discern the government action necessary to sustain
. . . them." 492 F.2d at 98. Weise ruled that a less
stringent standard for finding state action should be
applied when racial or sexual discrimination is at
issue, as is so often the case in employment
litigation, than when there is a claim of a First
Amendment violation. 522 F.2d at 405. Specifically,
although we reversed and remanded the dismissal of
plaintiffs' § 1983 claims that they were denied
employment or had their employment terminated
because of sex discrimination, 522 F.2d at 400, 413,
we explicitly stated that: "If our concern in this case
were with discipline and the First Amendment, the
alleged indicia of state action - funding and
regulation - would most likely be insufficient." 522
F.2d at 405.
The district court expressed concern that in
the absence of First Amendment restraints flowing
from a finding of government action, Amtrak could
post its own political advertisements on the
Spectacular, postulating the example that Amtrak
"would be free under the First Amendment to donate
its billboards to the support of the incumbent
President's election." 811 F. Supp. at 1000.
Whatever its constitutional implications, which we
do not address, such conduct would constitute a
criminal violation of federal law. See 2 U.S.C. §§
441b, 437g(d) (1988); see also Stern v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 287 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 921
F.2d 296, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting § 441b
prohibition of corporate political contributions).
Our opinion in Myron accords with
numerous cases that have concluded that Amtrak and
Conrail are not subject to constitutional restraints
upon government action. See, e.g., Andrews v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 682-83 (7th
Cir. 1987) (following Myron); G. & T. Terminal
Packaging Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 830 F.2d
1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Every court that has
considered the matter has concluded that Conrail is
not a governmental actor for purposes of
constitutional analysis."), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
988, 99 L.Ed. 2d 501, 108 S. Ct. 1291 (1988);
Morin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 720,
722-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (following
Myron); Anderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak), 754 F.2d 202, 204-05 (7th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Verdon v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 828 F.
Supp. 1129, 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Wilson v.
Amtrak Nat'l R.R. Corp., 824 F. Supp. 55, 57-58
(D. Md. 1992); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1516,
1524 n.11 (D.D.C. 1988); Marcucci v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 589 F. Supp. 725, 727-29
(N.D. Ill. 1984); Kimbrough v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 549 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 (M.D.
Ala. 1982).
In view of this unvarying line of authority,
and the fact that our pertinent precedent addressed an
issue of First Amendment retaliation, see Myron,
752 F.2d at 54, we conclude that Amtrak's refusal to
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run Lebron's advertisement on the Spectacular was
not government action, and accordingly is not to be
tested against the requirements of the First
Amendment. Thus, we do not reach the merits of
Lebron's First Amendment claim.
In view of the dismissal of Lebron's only
federal claim, it will not be appropriate for the
district court to address his contract claim on
remand. 2 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726-27, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130
(1966); Eatz v. DME Unit of Local Union No. 3,
973 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1992). Lebron is free to
pursue that claim in state court. Under N.Y. Civ.
Prac. L. & R. 213 (McKinney 1990), Lebron's
contract claim is subject to a six year statute of
limitations. See also id. 205(a) (McKinney Supp.
1993), id. cmt. 205:2 (McKinney 1990) (in any
event, Lebron may sue in state court within six
months of dismissal in federal court).
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is reversed
and the case is remanded with the instruction to
dismiss the complaint. As stated at oral arugment,
Lebron's motion to strike pages from the joint
appendix and for double costs and attorney fees is
denied; his motion to file a supplemental volume of
exhibits is granted.
* Judge Newman became chief judge of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on July 1, 1993.
** Judge Leval became a member of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals on November 8, 1993.
ENDNOTES TO OPINION
1. Some commentators have suggested that more recent
Supreme Court cases, and especially the Court's ruling that
the United States Olympic Committee is not a governmental
actor subject to constitutional restraints in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522, 542-47, 97 L. Ed. 2d 427, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987),
have curtailed Burton's precedential authority. See Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 18-3, at 1701 n. 13
(2d ed. 1988); Marcia Berman, An EquAl Protection Analysis
of Public and Private All-Male Military Schools, 1991 U.
Chi. Legal F. 211, 225-26; see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358
("actual holding" of Burton limited to lessees of public
property); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 317 n.7 (6th
Cir. 1988) ("The more recent Supreme Court cases in this
area appear to have limited the broad realm of state action
Burton suggested."), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042, 102 L. Ed.
2d 992, 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989); Imperiale v. Hahnemann
Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189, 195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (same),
aff'd, 966 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
2. Correspondingly, TDI's counterclaim for a declaratory
judgment that it is entitled to terminate the Lease will not be
decided in this action.
JON 0. NEWMAN, Chief Judge, dissenting:
The issue presented by this appeal is whether
Amtrak, formally known as the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, is subject to the First
Amendment when it acts to deny advertising space
on the basis of political content. Because I believe
the First Amendment limits Amtrak in making such
decisions, I respectfully dissent.
The Court does not dispute the detailed
findings of the District Court as to the extent of the
Government's role in the structure and financing of
Amtrak, including the undeniable fact that six
members of the nine-member Amtrak board are
appointed by the President of the United States, two
others by the Government as owner of Amtrak's
preferred stock, and the ninth member by the other
board members. Instead, the Court relies on prior
cases that have ruled Amtrak and Conrail not to be
governmental actors when they discharge or fail to
rehire workers, see, e.g., Andrews v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1987);
Anderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak), 754 F.2d 202, 204-05 (7th Cir. 1984),
even where First Amendment rights are peripherally
involved, see, e.g., Myron v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 752 F.2d 50, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1985).
However, it has long been the law in this
Circuit, and the Supreme Court has given no
contrary indication, that the state action
determination is dependent in part on the nature of
the constitutional right alleged to have been
impaired. See Weise v. Syracuse University, 522
F.2d 397, 404 (2d Cir. 1975); Wahba v. New York
University, 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 874, 42 L. Ed. 2d 113, 95 S. Ct. 135
(1974). In the District Court, Amtrak conceded that,
if it restricted service to passengers on the basis of
race, religion, or national origin, it would be deemed
a governmental actor in that respect. See Lebron v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 811 F.
Supp. 993, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
In view of the extensive involvement of the
Government in the structure and financing of
Amtrak, I agree with then-District Judge Leval that
Amtrak is a governmental actor, subject to First
Amendment limitations, when it undertakes to
regulate the political content of advertisements on its
billboards. Our ruling in Myron is not a precedent
for forgoing all First Amendment scrutiny with
respect to Amtrak. We there ruled that Conrail was
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not subject to First Amendment limitations for
discharging an employee for disloyalty. Though the
employee, an attorney, had sought to reenforce his
employment claim with an allegation that his First
Amendment right to represent fellow employees in
litigation was being impaired by his discharge, we
made it clear that what we were placing beyond
constitutional scrutiny were Conrail's "personnel
decisions." Myron, 752 F.2d at 55-56. At most an
indirect First Amendment issue was implicated. By
contrast, in the pending case Amtrak purports to
have complete insulation from a core First
Amendment claim -- that it determines the use of its
resources, in this case, the availability of its
advertising spaces, on the basis of political views.
In permitting this frontal First Amendment
challenge to be governed by the oblique First
Amendment ruling in Myron, the Court dismisses
rather brusquely the District Court's forcefully
articulated concerns as to the consequences of First
Amendment exemption for Amtrak in its advertising
decisions. Judge Leval pointed out that, without First
Amendment limitation, Amtrak would be free to
sponsor advertisements on its billboards taking sides
with respect to political contests, or promoting or
denigrating particular religions, or advocating its
view on contentious public issues like abortion. See
Lebron, 811 F. Supp. at 1000. The Court makes no
response with respect to the prospect of Amtrak's
using its advertising resources on matters of religion
or public issues, and rejects the concern about
politics by pointing out that "donation" of advertising
space would run afoul of existing statutes. No
mention is made of the District Court's valid concern
about Amtrak's opportunity to sell advertising space
only to candidates it favors.
In any event, the existence of a limited
statutory bar to one aspect of the serious concerns
raised by the District Court is no answer to Lebron's
constitutional claim. The fact that a corporation like
Amtrak, organized by authority of an act of
Congress, would be criminally liable if its donation
of advertising space were deemed to be a political
contribution, see 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 437g(d) (1988),
provides no remedy for a civil plaintiff like Lebron
who claims a First Amendment violation because his
offer to purchase advertising space has been rejected,
allegedly without required limitations on Amtrak's
discretion, because of the ad's political content.
Though I disagree with the majority's ruling
requiring the outright dismissal of Lebron's suit, I
would not uphold the District Court's injunction
requiring Amtrak to display Lebron's ad. Amtrak's
advertising policy may well run afoul of First
Amendment limitations, as the District Court ruled,
notably because the current "vague policy provides
Amtrak officials with precisely the kind of unfettered
discretion to control speech that the Supreme Court
has held to contravene the First Amendment,"
Lebron, 811 F. Supp. at 1003. But the policy,
despite its vagueness, is claimed to prohibit political
messages. This is not a case where an official,
subject to First Amendment restraint, has used
unfettered discretion to deny permission to use a
traditional public forum like city streets for a parade.
See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 22
L. Ed. 2d 162, 89 S. Ct. 935 (1969). Amtrak's
billboard space in Pennsylvania Station, even if used
in the past for ads of a public service nature, has not
become a forum for ads of such pointed political
content as Lebron's attack on the makers of Coors
beer for promoting "The Far Right's political
agenda." Lebron, 811 F. Supp. at 995. On the
present record, it is not an appropriate use of a
federal court's equity power to force Amtrak to
venture so extensively into the political arena. If the
denial of advertising space under Amtrak's existing
policies encounters First Amendment objections,
damage remedies and declaratory relief will have to
suffice.
For these reasons, I dissent from the
judgment ordering the complaint dismissed.
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93-723 U.S. v. X-CITEMENT VIDEO INC
Obscenity-Child pornography-Elements of of-
fense-Knowledge of actor's age.
Ruling below (CA 9, 982 F.2d 1285, 61 LW
2396, 52 CrL 1287):
Federal statute that prohibits distribution or
receipt of child pornography, 18 USC 2252, lacks
element of knowledge that actor is under age of
18 and thus violates First Amendment.
Question presented: Did court below correctly
hold that Section 2252 is unconstitutional on its
face on ground that it does not require govern-
ment to prove that defendant knew that materials
at issue show minors engaging in sexually explicit
acts?
Petition for certiorari filed 11/5/93, by Drew
S. Days III. Sol. Gen., John C. Keeney, Acting
Asst. Atty. Gen., William C. Bryson, Dpty. Sol.
Gen., Christopher J. Wright, Asst. to Sol. Gen.,
and Joel M. Gershowitz, Justice Dept. Atty.
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OPINION BY: CANBY, Circuit Judge
Defendant Rubin Gottesman appeals his conviction,
after a bench trial, for violating the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977
("Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq. (1988). Gottesman
was convicted of violating sections 2252(a)(1) and
(a)(2) of the Act, which prohibit the distribution,
receipt, or shipping of child pornography. Gottesman
challenges the Act as unconstitutional, both on its
face and as applied. We conclude that the Act is
unconstitutional on its face and, therefore, reverse.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1986 and 1987, an undercover police
officer contacted Gottesman, the operator of
X-Citement Video, Inc., and expressed interest in
buying pornographic videotapes featuring one Traci
Lords. The officer stated that he wanted tapes that
Lords had made when she was under the age of 18.
Gottesman eventually sold two sets of such tapes: the
first was a box of 49 tapes that he sold directly to
the police officer; the second was a box of 8 tapes
that Gottesman sold to the police officer and sent
(per the police officer's instructions) to Hawaii.
A federal grand jury indicted Gottesman for
distributing, shipping, and conspiring to distribute
and ship child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252. After a bench trial, Gottesman was
convicted on these counts; the district court
sentenced him to 12 months incarceration and
ordered him to pay a $100,000 fine.
After he had filed a notice of appeal to this
court, Gottesman requested a remand to the district
court for reconsideration in light of United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
L. Ed. 2d 53, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990), which we
granted. Gottesman then asserted before the district
court, first, that Thomas had ruled that section 2252
lacked a requirement that a defendant know that he
is distributing or shipping child pornography, and,
second, that, as construed, section 2252 on its face
violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. The district court rejected these
arguments and upheld the constitutionality of section
2252.
On appeal, Gottesman contends that: Section
2256 of the Act' is unconstitutional on its face
because it is vague and overbroad; section 2252 of
the Act2 is unconstitutional on its face because it
does not require scienter;3 and the Act, as applied,
violates the First and Fifth Amendments because the
tapes at issue are not child pornography. We reject
the challenges to section 2256 but agree that section
2252 is fatally defective. Because we conclude that
section 2252 is unconstitutional on its face, we do
not reach Gottesman's argument about the Act as
applied.
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DISCUSSION
I. Does Section 2256 Render the Act
Unconstitutionally Vague and Overbroad?
A. Is the Act Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Because it Raises the Statutory Age of
Majority from 16 to 18?
Gottesman asserts that section 2256' of the
Act its definitional section is facially
unconstitutional because it renders the Act applicable
to depictions of those under the age of 18, whereas
the statute upheld in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), set
the age of majority at 16. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at
774 (rejecting constitutional challenges to statute
prohibiting promotion or distribution of sexual
performances by children under the age of 16).
Gottesman argues that adding two years to the age of
majority renders the Act unconstitutionally
overbroad. He contends that it is far more difficult
to determine when a person is under 18 than it is to
determine when he or she is under 16. The result,
according to Gottesman, is that distribution of
sexually explicit material becomes such a hazardous
profession that its practitioners will refuse to handle
materials involving persons anywhere near the age of
18, thus restricting protected expression involving,
for example, 23- or 25-year-olds.
The Supreme Court stated in Ferber that it
would invalidate a statute for overbreadth "'only as
a last resort.' . . . The overbreadth involved [must]
be 'substantial' before the statute involved will be
invalidated on its face." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769
(citation omitted). Although Gottesman's argument is
not without some force, we see no basis for
concluding that any overbreadth here is sufficiently
greater than that attending a 16-year age line to
compel a different result. Indeed, we would not
lightly hold that the Constitution disables our society
from protecting those members it has traditionally
considered to be entitled to special protections -
minors. Gottesman merely quotes a district court
case discussing the Act's raising of the age of
majority from 16 to 18, United States v. Kantor, 677
F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1987), vacated, mandate
granted, United States v. United States District Court
for the Central District of California, 858 F.2d 534
(9th Cir. 1988), and a series of Supreme Court cases
that permit "adult" treatment of 16- and
17-year-olds. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 106 L. Ed. 2d 306, 109 S. Ct. 2969
(1989) (permitting capital punishment for 16- and
17-year-olds). With respect to the former, Kantor did
state that the Act seemed overbroad, but it also
refused to strike down the statute on its face, in light
of Ferber. With respect to the Supreme Court cases,
they merely permit, rather than require, adult
treatment of 16- and 17-year-olds. Moreover, they
indicate nothing about the substantiality (or lack
thereof) of the overbreadth of section 2256. Thus,
Gottesman's arguments are far from sufficient to
overcome the presumption against invalidating a
statute on its face for overbreadth.
B. Does Section 2256 Render the Act
Unconstitutionally Overbroad or Vague
Because it Substitutes "Lascivious" for
"Lewd"?
Gottesman contends that section 2256 is
overbroad and vague because Congress replaced
"lewd" with "lascivious" in defining illegal
exhibition of the genitals of children. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2)(E). In so arguing, he ignores United States
v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 856, 98 L. Ed. 2d 118, 108 S. Ct. 164
(1987), in which we rejected a similar argument,
stating that "'lascivious' is no different in its
meaning than 'lewd,' a commonsensical term whose
constitutionality was specifically upheld in Miller v.
California and in Ferber." Wiegand, 812 F.2d at
1243 (citations omitted). We adhere to the view
expressed in Wiegand.
C. Does Section 2256 Render the Act
Unconstitutionally Overbroad or Vague
Because it Prohibits Actual or Simulated
Bestiality and Sadistic or Masochistic
Abuse?
Gottesman asserts that section 2256 is
overbroad and vague because it includes among the
covered acts, without further definition, actual or
simulated bestiality and sadistic or masochistic
abuse. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). This argument was
essentially answered in Ferber, which upheld the
constitutionality of a similar statute. The relevant
section of the statute at issue in Ferber defined the
prohibited sexual conduct as "'actual or simulated
sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual
bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
lewd exhibition of the genitals."' 458 U.S. at 751.
Gottesman focuses on three differences
between section 2256 and the statute in Ferber: First,
he argues that section 2256's prohibition of
"simulated" acts renders it overbroad and vague. The
statute in Ferber also prohibited "simulated" acts,
however, and the structure of the sentence suggests
that "simulated" modified all the acts on the list.
Thus, there is no meaningful distinction between
section 2256 and the Ferber statute in this regard.
Second, Gottesman focuses on section 2556(2)(D)'s
alleged inclusion of "sadistic or masochistic; abuse."
The semicolon before "abuse" is a typographical
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error in the unofficial code, however; the official
version of section 2256(2)(D) states "sadistic or
masochistic abuse." Compare 18 U.S.C. §
2256(2)(D) (1988) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256(2)(D)
(West Supp. 1992). The only difference between
section 2256 and the Ferber statute, therefore, is the
former's replacement of "sado-masochistic abuse"
with "sadistic or masochistic abuse." The two terms
are indistinguishable. The final difference that
Gottesman cites is that the Ferber statute prohibited
"sexual bestiality," whereas section 2256 refers only
to "bestiality." Gottesman suggests that, under
section 2256, "bestiality" could be read to encompass
its entire dictionary definition, so that it would also
prohibit, e.g., "the display, gratification, or an
instance of bestial traits or impulses." Webster's
International Dictionary (3rd ed. 1966). In context,
however, such a reading would not be justified;
"bestiality" is listed as a subcategory of "sexually
explicit conduct." The term can hardly be interpreted
to mean "acting beastly"; properly construed, the
term is no different from Ferber's "sexual
bestiality."
Thus, we reject all of Gottesman's vagueness
and overbreadth challenges to the Act.
H. Does Section 2252 Render the Act
Unconstitutional Because it Does Not
Require Proof of Scienter that the Materials
Distributed Are Child Pornography?
Gottesman's other facial challenge to the Act
is that section 2252 - the section prohibiting, inter
alia, the distribution or receipt of child pornography
- violates the guarantee of free speech under the First
Amendment and the guarantee of due process under
the Fifth Amendment because it does not require that
the prosecution demonstrate the defendant's
knowledge of the age of the performers. Gottesman
argues that: (1) section 2252 does not include a
scienter requirement regarding the minority of the
performers; and (2) the lack of a scienter
requirement violates the First and Fifth Amendments
to the Constitution.
A. What Showing of Scienter Does Section
2252 Require?
The main point of contention between the
parties is over the scienter requirement of section
2252. Gottesman contends that section 2252 does not
require knowledge of the minority of the performers,
whereas the government argues that section 2252
requires knowledge of "the nature and character of
the material." The government's position is a bit
cagey; it suggests at times that the statute requires
that the distributor know that the material is child
pornography, but argues that it does not require that
the distributor know the age of the performers. Of
course, it would make no difference under any
construction of the statute if the defendant did not
know precisely whether the underage performer was
age 6, 7 or 8. What the government seems to be
saying in its brief, however, is that the statute does
not even require that the defendant know that one or
more performers was under the age of 18, so long as
he knew the general nature of the materials he was
distributing.
We ruled on the question of the scienter
required by the Act in Thomas, in which the
defendant was accused of violating section 2252.
Thomas, like Gottesman in the instant case, argued
that section 2252 requires knowledge of the minority
of the performer, and that, therefore, the indictment
was insufficient because it failed to allege that
Thomas knew that the pornography he transported
depicted a minor. After setting forth section 2252,
we stated that
In subsection 1, "knowingly" modifies only
"transports or ships." In subsection 2,
"knowingly" modifies only "receives." The
section [2252], therefore, does not require
that Thomas knew that the pornography he
transported, mailed, and received involved
a minor. The section requires only that
Thomas knowingly transported and received
the material.
893 F.2d at 1070 (emphasis added).
Thus, Thomas held that section 2252 does not
require knowledge that the material involves a
minor. In fact, Thomas indicates that section 2252
does not require any knowledge of the contents of
the material; the only scienter requirement of section
2252 is the defendant's knowledge that he mailed the
material.
The government does not attempt to
distinguish Thomas, but rather relies on United
States v. Moncini, 882 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1989). In
Moncini, the defendant argued that section 2252
requires the government to prove that a defendant
knew that mailing child pornography was illegal. We
rejected this argument, stating that "section 2252(a)
requires that the government prove that the defendant
had knowledge of the nature of the contents of the
visual depictions and that the depictions were to be
transported or shipped," but that no more was
required. Id. at 404. Thus, we held that section 2252
did not require knowledge of the illegality of mailing
child pornography. See also United States v. Brown,
862 F.2d 1033, 1036 (3rd Cir. 1988) (under section
2252 "recipient need only know that the material he
receives is child pornography").
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The problem with the government's reliance
on Moncini is that its statement that knowledge of
the contents is required is dictum. In Moncini, the
question before us was whether section 2252 requires
knowledge of the illegality of the mailings; the
statement regarding knowledge of the contents was
unnecessary to our ruling. In Thomas, on the other
hand, the defendant squarely raised the question of
whether section 2252 requires knowledge that the
performers are under the age of 18. Our statement
that section 2252 requires no such knowledge
constituted part of our ruling. Thus, Thomas is the
only precedent from this circuit on the question of
whether section 2252 requires scienter of the
minority of the performers. We are bound by its
conclusion that section 2252 contains no such
requirement.
B. What Level of Scienter Does the
Constitution Require?
Gottesman contends - and the government
does not dispute - that a statute prohibiting the
distribution of printed or taped materials that does
not require some knowledge of the contents of the
material violates the First and Fifth Amendments of
the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court so ruled
in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 4 L. Ed. 2d
205, 80 S. Ct. 215 (1959). In Smith, the Court held
that the First Amendment prohibits prosecution of a
book distributor for possession of an obscene book
unless the distributor has "knowledge of the contents
of the book." 361 U.S. at 153. See Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 765 ("As with obscenity laws, criminal
responsibility may not be imposed without some
element of scienter on the part of the defendant.");
see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115, 109
L. Ed. 2d 98, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (noting "the
requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on
child pornography include some element of
scienter").
The Smith opinion did not delineate the level
of scienter that the Constitution requires. In Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, 94
S. Ct. 2887 (1974) and Ripplinger v. Collins, 868
F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989), however, the
constitutional requirements were clarified somewhat.
In Hamling, a defendant convicted of distributing
obscene material argued that the government was
required to prove that he knew that the material was
obscene. The Supreme Court, in rejecting this
argument, stated that: "It is constitutionally sufficient
that the prosecution show that a defendant had
knowledge of the contents of the materials he
distributed, and that he knew the character and
nature of the materials." Hamling, 418 U.S. at 123.
We applied Hamling in Ripplinger, finding a
statutory definition unconstitutional on its face
because it did not require actual knowledge of the
contents of the pornographic material. In so ruling,
we indicated that a statute must require knowledge of
the character of the materials in order to pass
constitutional muster. Ripplinger, 868 F.2d at 1056.
In purporting to apply these principles here,
the government once again skates a very fine line in
its brief. It concedes that, to be constitutional, the
statute must require knowledge of the nature and
character of the material, and it sometimes
formulates this requirement as knowledge that the
material is "child pornography." On the other hand,
it appears to resist a requirement of proof that the
defendant know that one or more performers were
underage. It emphasizes that the Constitution does
not require knowledge by the defendant of the actual
age of the underage performer. Of course that must
be true. The question, however, is whether it
requires knowledge that one or more per formers
was under age 18. In at least part of its argument,
the government seems to suggest that there is no
such requirement:
Thus, the scienter required by the child
pornography statutes is analogous to that
required for obscenity convictions - general
knowledge of the nature of the contents of
the materials, not knowledge of the specific
age of the minor. See also United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir.
1990) (section 2252(a) does not require proof
that defendant knew that pornography
involved a minor). . . .
Government's brief, p. 17.
At oral argument, the government moved away
somewhat from this perch and conceded that the
statute would have severe constitutional problems if
it did not include a requirement of knowledge that at
least one performer engaged in the specified sexually
explicit acts was under 18 years of age.
Whatever the government's position, we
conclude that the constitutional minimum
requirement of scienter for the Act's proscription of
transporting or receiving child pornography is
knowledge that at least one of the performers is
under age 18. It is true that, in Hamling, it was not
necessary that the violator know that the material he
was distributing was obscene. But the Supreme
Court's point was that it was not essential that the
violator know the legal status of the materials; he
could not "avoid prosecution by simply claiming that
he had not brushed up on the law." Hamling, 418
U.S. at 123. The question before us does not
concern the defendant's requisite knowledge of the
law; it concerns his knowledge of a particular fact -
the underage of the performer.
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Our decision in United States v. United
States District Court for the Central District of
California, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988), is highly
instructive. There we dealt with charges under
section 2251(a) of the Act against producers of films
also featuring the redoubtable Traci Lords; the issue
was whether the producers were entitled to an
affirmative defense that they were deceived by Lords
into believing that she was an adult. We held that the
First Amendment required that provision for such a
defense be engrafted onto the Act. Id. at 538-44. We
declined to hold, however, that the Constitution
required knowledge of the minority of the performer
to be an element of the offense. Our reasons for so
declining are most relevant here:
Defendants would have us go
farther and hold that the first amendment
requires the government to prove scienter as
part of its case. They rely on the Supreme
Court cases holding that the government
must carry such a burden in cases involving
booksellers and other downstream
distributors. See, e.g., Hamling, 418 U.S.
at 123, 94 S. Ct. at 2910. We do not view
these cases as controlling here. Those who
arrange for minors to appear in sexually
explicit materials are in a far different
position from those who merely handle the
visual images after they are fixed on paper,
celluloid or magnetic tape. While it would
undoubtedly chill the distribution of books
and films if sellers were burdened with
learning not only the content of all of the
materials they carry but also the ages of the
actors with whom they have had no direct
contact, see Smith, 361 U.S. at 153-54, 80
S. Ct. at 218-19, producers are in a position
to know or learn the ages of their
employees. We note that several states have
taken this approach. . . .
Id. at 543-44 n.6.
These considerations concerning distributors or
receivers are directly applicable here, and we find
them compelling. Section 2252 potentially applies to
all kinds of recipients or distributors of videotapes
and magazines. To render them all prima facie
criminals if one of the performers in a portrayal of
sexually explicit conduct is underage, without the
distributor's or recipient's knowledge, would be to
create precisely the kind of chilling effect condemned
by Smith. That we cannot do consistently with the
First Amendment as the Supreme Court has
interpreted it.
We conclude, therefore, that the First
Amendment mandates that a statute prohibiting the
distribution, shipping or receipt of child pornography
require knowledge of the minority of the performers
as an element of the crime it defines. Section 2252,
as authoritatively construed by Thomas, does not so
require.
The question then arises whether, in the face
of Thomas, we could construe section 2252 so as to
save its constitutionality. In District Court, we
engrafted an affirmative defense onto section 2251(a)
in order to save it. Despite that example, we do not
feel free to follow an analogous course here. First,
it comes closer to judicial rewriting of a statute to
engraft onto it an element of the crime than it does
to recognize an affirmative defense, of a type that
often exists without being specified in the statute
defining the crime. See District Court, 858 F.2d at
542. Second, Thomas decided the precise question
whether knowledge of the performer's underage was
an element of 2252, and it cited District Court for
the analogous proposition that scienter was not an
element of section 2251. Thomas, then, was decided
in full knowledge of District Court and its rationale.
Thomas nevertheless ruled squarely that scienter of
the minority of the performer was not an element of
the crime defined by section 2252. Not sitting as an
en banc court, we regard ourselves as bound by
Thomas's interpretation.
CONCLUSION
In summary, then, we conclude that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution
mandates that a statute prohibiting the distribution,
shipping or receipt of child pornography require as
an element knowledge of the minority of at least one
of the performers who engage in or portray the
specified conduct. Section 2252, as authoritatively
construed by Thomas, does not so require. As a
result, section 2252 is unconstitutional on its face.
Gottesman's conviction therefore cannot stand.
REVERSED.
ENDNOTES TO OPINION
1. Section 2256 provides that:
For the purposes of this chapter, the term
(1) "minor" means any person under the age
of eighteen years;
(2) "sexually explicit conduct" means actual or
simulated
(A) sexual intercourse, including
genital-genital, oral-genital,
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether
between persons of the same or
opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
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(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of any person;
(3) "producing" means producing, directing,
manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or
advertising;
(4) "organization" means a person other than
an individual;
(5) "visual depiction" includes undeveloped
film and videotape;
(6) "computer" has the meaning given that
term in section 1030 of this title; and
(7) "custody or control" includes temporary
supervision over or responsibility for a
minor whether legally or illegally obtained.
2. The relevant portions of Section 2252 provide that:
(a) Any person who -
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mails any visual
depiction, if -
(A) the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) such visual depiction is of such
conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes any
visual depiction that has been mailed, or
has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which
contains materials which have been mailed
or so shipped or transported, by any means
including by computer, or knowingly
reproduces any visual depiction for
distribution in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means including by
computer or through the mails, if -
(A) the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) such visual depiction is of such
conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b)(1) Whoever violates
paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of subsection (a) shall be
fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both, but, if
such person has a prior
conviction under this
section, such person shall
be fined under this title
and imprisoned for not
less than five years nor
more than fifteen years.
3. Gottesman also argues that the indictment was insufficient
because it did not allege scienter. In light of our ruling on the
constitutionality of the Act, we do not address this issue.
4. Gottesman refers to this section as § 2255. The difference
is inconsequential: Section 2255 was recently renumbered as
§ 2256, and they are otherwise identical.
DISSENT: KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting in
part.*
What makes this case hard is that most of the
materials defendant distributes are protected by the
First Amendment. The thought that someone in his
position might be convicted, despite an innocent
mind, because of a short scene in one videotape
among the thousands he carries in stock, should give
pause to anyone concerned about free speech. I
therefore agree with my colleagues that a child
pornography statute must contain a mens rea
requirement. But I do not agree that Gottesman must
have known the videos he sold depicted child
pornography; recklessness on his part would have
sufficed. Moreover, under our traditional rules of
construction, we can read a recklessness mental state
into the statute, to bring it in line with the
Constitution. Indeed, we have a duty to do so.
I
Part II(B) of the majority opinion answers the
question: "What level of scienter does the
Constitution require?" It concludes that a defendant
in a child pornography case must be proven to have
"knowledge of the minority of at least one of the
performers." Maj. op. at 14536. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority relies on New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113, 102 S.
Ct. 3348 (1982), which holds that, under a child
pornography statute, "as with obscenity laws,
criminal responsibility may not be imposed without
some element of scienter." Id. at 765 (emphasis
added). But Ferber did not say what level of scienter
is sufficient in a child pornography case - whether it
be purposefulness, knowledge, recklessness,
negligence, or something else altogether.
The Supreme Court answered this question
eight years later in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
109 L. Ed. 2d 98, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990). Osborne
upheld a statute that outlawed the possession of child
pornography where the defendant either knew the
performers were underage or was at least reckless as
to this fact. The Court considered Osborne's
argument that the statute was "unconstitutionally
overbroad because it applied in instances where
viewers or possessors lack scienter," and rejected it
because "although [the challenged statute] does not
specify a mental state, Ohio law provides that
recklessness is the appropriate mens rea where a
statute neither specifies culpability nor plainly
indicates a purpose to impose strict liability." Id. at
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113 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Recklessness, the Court held, "plainly satisfied the
requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on
child pornography include some element of scienter."
Id. at 115 (emphasis added). The mens rea issue was
squarely raised and squarely resolved. I don't
understand how the majority can fail to follow - or
even address - this passage from Osborne.'
The majority is led astray by Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205, 80 S.
Ct. 215 (1959), Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974), and
Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1989)
- all adult obscenity cases. Ferber did indeed refer to
the scienter requirement of obscenity cases such as
these when announcing a scienter requirement in
child pornography cases, but only by way of
analogy. 458 U.S. at 765. In fact, Ferber blazed a
trail for child pornography quite separate from that
for obscenity. This distinction is rooted in the
government's greater power to prohibit child
pornography. The Ferber Court painfully catalogued
the harms sexual exploitation inflicts on children,
demonstrating the surpassing importance of the
government's interests in this area. Id. at 756-62;'
accord Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10. Because these
interests provide a far more compelling basis for
prohibiting child pornography than adult
pornography,' the Court in Ferber cast child
pornography outside the umbrella of the First
Amendment, without regard to whether the materials
in question were obscene. 458 U.S. at 764.
All this means that obscenity precedents just
don't work in the child pornography context. For
instance, private possession of child pornography can
be criminalized, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108, while
private possession of obscene material cannot,
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, 22 L. Ed.
2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969).4 Similarly, child
pornography can be barred even if it doesn't appeal
to prurient interests, even if it isn't patently offensive
and even without considering the work as a whole.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. But see Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419, 93
S. Ct. 2607 (1973). Justices Brennan and Marshall,
consistent dissenters in the court's major obscenity
cases, concurred in Ferber. Compare Miller, 413
U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 37 L. Ed. 2d
446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
with Ferber, 458 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Just as telling is the Court's more relaxed
approach to scienter in child pornography cases.
Osborne's one short paragraph in the text, 495 U.S.
at 115, and two equally laconic sentences in an
omnibus footnote disposing of two unrelated claims,
id. at 112 n.9, stand in stark contrast to other First
Amendment cases where the Court agonized at
length over the scienter issue. See, e.g., Smith, 361
U.S. at 150-55 (scienter required for obscenity
prosecution); Hamling, 418 U.S. at 118-24
(knowledge of nature and character of materials
rather than knowledge of their legal status as
obscenity is proper mental state for obscenity
prosecution); see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686,
84 S. Ct. 710 (1964) (announcing actual malice
requirement in defamation action by public figure);
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 115 L. Ed.
2d 447, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2431-33 (1991) (fleshing
out actual malice standard as applied to defamatory
statements in the form of inaccurate direct
quotations).
These distinctions bear out the original
observation in Ferber that "the States are entitled to
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children" than in regulation of
obscenity. They cast serious doubt on any analysis
that relies on obscenity cases in the child
pornography context. Id. at 756.' Osborne is the
relevant authority and Osborne holds that
recklessness is a sufficient mental state to support a
conviction in a child pornography case.
II
A. All of this would be beside the point if, as
the majority suggests, United States v. Thomas, 893
F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 2d
53, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990), conclusively held that 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a) is a strict liability statute. But
Thomas addressed only a very narrow question:
Does section 2252(a), as a matter of simple statutory
construction, require the government to prove the
defendant knew the materials contained child
pornography? All Thomas tells us is that the word
"knowingly" in the statute does not apply to the age
of the depicted children. 893 F.2d at 1070. This is
not much more than we would learn by reading the
statute ourselves. The ruling neither considered nor
excluded the possibility that a lower level of scienter,
like recklessness, might apply as a matter of
constitutional interpretation."
The defendant in Thomas made no
constitutional argument; the Thomas court said
nothing about the First Amendment. Indeed, had
Thomas addressed the constitutional issue, it would
have been bound by both the Supreme Court's and
our own holdings that child pornography can't be a
strict liability offense. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765;
United States v. United States District Court, 858
F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Kantor")
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(interpreting a different section of the same statute
involved here and in Thomas). Had Thomas
considered the First Amendment, it would have had
to either follow Kantor and read a scienter
requirement into the statute, or strike the statute
down altogether.
Of course, there is absolutely nothing wrong
with the Thomas decision. We generally deal only
with arguments raised by the parties. Collins v. City
of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 339 (9th Cir. 1988). If
the defendant did not raise a First Amendment
defense, the panel had no obligation to raise it for
him. But surely Thomas's failure to decide the
constitutional question - how to interpret section
2252(a) in light of the First Amendment - cannot
foreclose us from deciding that question now that it's
been squarely put to us. See, e.g., United States v.
Vroman, 975 F.2d 669, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1992).
The majority's supine willingness to be bound
by a panel that decided a question different from that
posed to us leads to truly paradoxical results.
Because of an accident of timing - because the first
defendant to challenge section 2252(a) neglected to
raise a First Amendment claim - section 2252(a)
turns out to be unconstitutional. See maj. op. at
14535- 36. A neighboring section, 2251(a), is saved
because the first case to consider it did present a
First Amendment challenge, giving us the
opportunity to narrow it. See Kantor, 858 F.2d at
542-44.
Our jurisprudence cannot evolve in such a
haphazard fashion. Under the majority's reasoning
no court would be able save section 2252(a). Not
Thomas because they had no reason to confront the
issue; and not we today because we are bound by
Thomas. Our prudential rule of avoiding
unnecessary consideration of issues not put before us
by the parties turns into a trap. Giving preclusive
force to the never-contemplated emanations from
Thomas undermines our duty to save the statute if
we can.7
B. Because Thomas cannot be read to foreclose
an issue that it had no reason to reach, it is our job
to confront it today: Can we save 2252(a) by reading
into it a requirement that defendant here acted
recklessly as to the age the minor?' Not only can
we, we must. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 499-501, 95 L. Ed. 1137, 71 S. Ct.
857 (1950) (plurality opinion).
Statutes often fail to specify mental states for
each element of the criminal offense, and courts
routinely read scienter into a statute even absent
constitutional considerations. See Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 85 L. Ed. 2d 434, 105 S.
Ct. 2084 (1985); United States v. O'Mara, 963 F.2d
1288, 1292-96 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). In Kantor, we grafted an affirmative
defense of reasonable mistake of age onto the statute,
something far more exotic than just reading in a
mental state element. Having determined under
Ferber and Osborne that the federal child
pornography statute is constitutional if only it
includes a mens rea requirement, I would pose the
same question here as we did in Kantor: Would
Congress, if given the choice, have passed section
2252(a) with a recklessness requirement as to the age
of the minor, or not passed it at all? Kantor, 858
F.2d at 542; see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 653, 82 L. Ed. 2d 487, 104 S. Ct. 3262 (1984)
(plurality); id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring). To
pose the question is to answer it. Congress grave
problem, one deserving sweeping prohibitions and
strict sanctions. It is inconceivable that, given the
choice between no statute at all and a statute that
contains a requirement of recklessness, those
involved in passing the child pornography statute
would have chosen the former rather than the latter.
In drafting the statute, Congress did delete a
knowledge requirement, but I do not read this as
precluding any and all scienter requirements. Indeed,
"we are quite sure that the policies Congress sought
to advance by enacting [section 2252(a)] can be
effectuated even" after we read a mental state
element of recklessness into the statute. Regan, 468
U.S. at 653.
We must be chary of striking down an Act of
Congress, particularly one that promotes interests as
vital as protecting children from sexual exploitation.
We have already saved section 2252(a)'s companion
statute from unconstitutionality by correcting a very
similar defect. Kantor, 858 F.2d at 542-44. I see no
impediment to saving the statute once again; in fact,
the second time around should be easier than the
first.
Conclusion
After Osborne, it's settled that recklessness is
a sufficient level of scienter under the First
Amendment in a child pornography case;
accordingly, I dissent from Part II(B) of the majority
opinion which announces a knowledge requirement.
Building on this distinct starting point with respect to
mental state, I also disagree with Part II(A), which
holds that our prior decisions preclude reading a
recklessness requirement into section 2252. 1 join the
other parts of the opinion.
* Strictly speaking, this is a concurrence, because I
too would reverse Gottesman's conviction on the
ground that he was tried under a theory which
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imposed strict liability as to the age of the minor. I
style it a dissent, however, because I would avoid
striking down an Act of Congress, and would
remand for a retrial under a statute properly
narrowed to comply with constitutional norms.
ENDNOTES FOR DISSENT
1. Osborne might be distinguished because it is a possession
case, not a distribution case. However, this distinction cuts
entirely the wrong way for the defendant here. Under Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542, 89 S. Ct. 1243
(1969), the state has more latitude to proscribe the
distribution of materials not protected by the First
Amendment than it does when prohibiting their private
possession. Id. at 568 ("States retain broad power to regulate
obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own
home.") If recklessness was scienter enough to convict
Osborne for his private possession of child pornography, it is
certainly enough to convict Gottesman for distributing it.
2. The Court recognized that "the distribution of photographs
and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children," 458 U.S. at 759; that
"the advertising and selling of child pornography provide an
economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the
production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the
Nation," id. at 761; and that "the value of permitting live
performances and photographic reproductions of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not
de minimis," id. at 762. Noting the strength of the
government interest in "safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of . .. minors," id. at 756-57, the
Court said it would "not second-guess [New York's]
legislative judgment . . . that the use of children as subjects
of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the child," id. at 757-58.
The scars of child pornography can last a lifetime. As
adults, those exploited as minors may be under pressure to
rationalize their conduct, even though they bear no moral
responsibility for it. Consider the words of the 24-year old
Traci Lords: "I don't think I did anything that special or
weird or different. The only difference was that I did it on
video. Every teenage cheerleader runs around, screws half the
football team, and takes drugs. The major difference is that
the evidence of my doing it existed on the shelves of video
stores." Michael Kaplan, The House of Lords, Movieline,
Jan./Feb. 1993, at 71, 72.
3. Pornography featuring adults can be regulated to protect
unwilling recipients and juveniles from offensive exposure,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419,
93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973), and to vindicate society's interest in
order and morality, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 61, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973). Because
these interests are weaker than that in protecting children
from appearing in sexually explicit materials, the state may
prohibit non-obscene child pornography but only obscene
adult pornography. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
Of course, many have argued - and many more have
disagreed with them - that, just as the child pornography trade
harms children, adult pornography harms both the people who
appear in the materials, and the people who are hurt by the
attitudes these materials foster. But society's interest in
avoiding these harms has been held to not justify restricting
speech. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475 U.S. 1001, 89
L. Ed. 2d 291, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986). But see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589.
See generally Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1125-26 &
n.1 (12th (wheeled) ed. 1991) (as usual, most of the action is
in the footnote).
4. "We find this case distinct from Stanley because the
interest underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed
the interest justifying the Georgia law at issue in Stanley."
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108.
5. For a discussion of the doctrinal isolation of child
pornography cases and the need for separate standards to
decide them, see Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 285,
287-88 & 308-09:
[Ferber created] yet another comparatively distinct
area of First Amendment doctrine. The rules relating
to child pornography now take their place alongside
the equally distinct rules relating to obscenity,
defamation, advocacy of illegal conduct, invasion of
privacy, fighting words, symbolic speech, and
offensive speech. Moreover, each of these areas
contains its own corpus of subrules, principles,
categories, qualifications, and exceptions. . . When
we take all this together it becomes clear that the First
Amendment is becoming increasingly intricate....
Id. at 308-09.
Schauer generally applauded the Court's segregation of child
pornography and obscenity into more distinct categories for
purposes of First Amendment scrutiny. However, he
presciently flagged as a potential pitfall precisely the kind of
mistake the majority makes here: "Extreme subdivision of the
First Amendment magnifies the risk that an increasingly
complex body of doctrine, even if theoretically sound, will be
beyond the interpretative capacities of those who must follow
the Supreme Court's lead primarily lower court judges,
legislatures, and prosecutors." Id. at 288.
6. My colleagues may be distracted by Thomas because of an
unfortunate accident of nomenclature. Both statutory
construction and constitutional narrowing are sometimes
referred to as interpretation. They are, in fact, very different
animals. Statutory interpretation is an attempt to divine the
meaning of the statute as passed by Congress and signed by
the President. Constitutional narrowing seeks to add a
constraint to the statute that its drafters plainly had not meant
to put there; it is akin to partial invalidation of the statute.
See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-654, 82
L. Ed. 2d 487, 104 S. Ct. 3262 (1984). In performing the
former task we may not add anything to the statute that is not
already there (or ignore anything that is); in performing the
latter function, we must do precisely that. In pure
interpretation, we must carry out the legislative will. In
performing our constitutional narrowing function, we may
come up with any interpretation we have reason to believe
Congress would not have rejected. See Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 99 L. Ed. 2d
645 (1988) (courts should construe statutes to avoid
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unconstitutionality "unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress").
7. First Amendment challenges to statutes often arise long
after the statute is first applied. Title VII, for instance, has
for over a decade restricted harassing speech in the,
workplace, but the first reported federal case involving a First
Amendment defense was decided only in 1991. See, e.g.,
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900-01 (11th Cir.
1982); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1534-37 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see generally Barbara
Lindemann & David D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in
Employment Law 592-600 (1992). Because First Amendment
defenses were rarely raised, harassment law evolved with
little concern for free speech, and some workplace harassment
cases seem suspect on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g.,
Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F Supp. 521, 531-32
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (injunction banning "any racial, ethnic, or
religious slurs . . . in the form of 'jokes,' 'jests,' or
otherwise," whether or not severe or pervasive enough to
create a hostile work environment), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1094 (2d
Cir. 1986); Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F Supp.
951, 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (use of gender-based terms
like "foreman" or "draftsman" could be harassment), aff'd
without opinion, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1991). For an
excellent discussion of the issue, see Eugene Volokh, Note,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L.
Rev. 1791, 1800-07 (1992) (describing other cases). See also
Lindemann & Kadue, supra; Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII
as Censorship: Hostile Environment Harassment and the First
Amendment, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 481 (1991); Marcy Strauss,
Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
1 (1990).
We may one day conclude that some workplace speech
- for instance, a bigoted political poster - is protected even if
it creates a hostile work environment. But if this happens,
surely the right answer is to save as much of workplace
harassment law as we can, not to throw it all out just because
a few courts, not faced with First Amendment defenses, may
have read it too broadly.
8. Which mental state to choose is not entirely clear. In
Kantor, we stated that "Congress may take steps to punish
severely those who knowingly subject minors to sexual
exploitation, and even those who commit such abuse
recklessly or negligently. . . ." 858 F.2d at 540. We know,
after Osborne, that recklessness is sufficient, but it is not at
all clear that a lesser state of mind, such as negligence, would
not suffice to save the statute. Cf. Robert R. Strang, Note,
"She Was Just Seventeen . .. and the Way She Looked Was
Way Beyond [Her Years]": Child Pornography and
Overbreadth, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1779, 1801-02 (1990)
(providing mistake of age defense to section 2252 prosecution
satisfies First Amendment scienter requirement).
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Zoning-AduLt entertainment-Content-based
censorship.
Ruling below (CA 8, 12 F.3d 140):
City ordinance that makes available two zones
in which sexually oriented businesses may locate,
provided that they are situated at least 1000 feet
from residentially zoned property. day-care cen-
ters, educational facilities, public librarics and
parks, other sexually oriented businesses, liquor
establishments, and churches, is content-neutral
and narrowly tailored to achieve substantial gov-
ernmental interest in avoiding negative secondary
effects of such businesses established by studies
of effects of such businesses in other cities, in-
cluding increased crime, diminished property val-
ues, and general neighborhood blight; according-
ly, ordinance is reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction on speech, and does not violate
First Amendment.
Questions presented: (1) Does adult entertain-
ment zoning ordinance constitute impermissible
content-based censorship, when it amortizes out
of existence lawful non-conforming adult enter-
tainment uses, solely on basis of content of mate-
rials sold and exhibited, regardless of secondary
effects, but permits non-adult uses defined, solely
on basis of content, to remain in existence in
absence of affirmative showing of adverse second-
ary effects? (2) Does adult entertainment zoning
ordinance satisfy constitutiona! requirements for
alternative avenues of communication, when vir-
tually all of land area for permitted adult uses is
available only at discretion of city council? (3)
Does adult entertainment zoning ordinance satis-
fy constitutional requirements for alternative ave-
nues of communication, when only area available
for adult entertainment is vacant, undeveloped
property, at which no commercial use would be
viable?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/11/94, by Ran-
dall D. B. Tigue, of Minneapolis, Minn.
288
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FAGG, Circuit Judge.
Larry Holmberg owns and operates an
adults-only business that deals in sexually explicit
materials protected under the First Amendment.
Holmberg brought this action against the City of
Ramsey challenging the constitutionality of the City's
zoning ordinance, which requires Holmberg to
relocate his business because the business is located
within 1000 feet of a day-care center, a church, a
bowling alley that serves liquor, and residential
property. Following a trial, the district court upheld
the ordinance. Schneider v. City of Ramsey, 800 F.
Supp. 815 (D. Minn. 1992). Holmberg appeals and
we affirm.
On April 19, 1990, Holmberg opened his
business on property he owned near Highway 10, the
main commercial road through the City. Although
Holmberg's business does not have direct access to
Highway 10, the business is visible from the
highway. Holmberg sells adults-only books and
magazines and sexual novelties. Holmberg also
provides coin-operated machines for viewing
adults-only movies on the premises. Because
Holmberg's business was the first of its kind in the
City and the City had no ordinance dealing with
sexually oriented businesses, the Ramsey City
Council met to consider the advisability of amending
its zoning ordinance. Having decided to study how
these businesses affect their neighborhoods, the City
Council passed an interim ordinance banning the
operation of sexually oriented businesses until the
study was completed. After Holmberg obtained a
district court restraining order prohibiting the City
from closing his business, the City Council lifted the
interim ordinance's ban so Holmberg could operate
his business. Although the City Council's initial
action was constitutionally flawed, the district court
made clear that the City Council passed the interim
ordinance to foster an orderly study and to develop
an appropriate zoning measure, rather than to
suppress Holmberg's adults-only materials.
The City promptly hired a professional city
planner to investigate the secondary effects of
sexually oriented businesses and prepare a report for
the City Council's consideration. The planner
gathered and analyzed relevant neighborhood impact
studies conducted by other cities located inside and
outside of Minnesota. The planner also examined a
variety of relevant reports, including a Minnesota
Attorney General's report about regulating these
businesses. Based on the planner's report,
recommendations by the city planning commission,
and local public hearings, the City Council
concluded that sexually oriented businesses like
Holmberg's would produce negative secondary
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effects including increased crime, diminished
property values, and general neighborhood blight in
Ramsey. The City Council then amended the City's
zoning ordinance to include provisions aimed at
minimizing the unwanted secondary 'effects of
sexually oriented businesses.
As amended, the zoning ordinance designates
two commercial zones in which sexually oriented
businesses may operate. Within these zones, sexually
oriented businesses must be located at least 1000 feet
from residentially zoned property, day-care centers,
educational facilities, public libraries, public parks,
other sexually oriented businesses, qn-sale liquor
establishments, and churches. Although Holmberg's
business is located within one of the newly-created
zones, Holmberg's business is' nonconforming
because it is located within 1000 feet of A~day-care
center, a church, a bowling alley that serves liquor,
and residential property. Thus, under the zoning
ordinance, Holmberg" must relocate his business
within a given grace period. Holmberg neither
challenges the reasonableness of the grace period nor
claims he is unable to recoup his investment within
this period.
Relying on City of Renton v. Playtimne
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106
S. Ct. 925 (1986), the 'district court concluded
Ramsey's zoning ordinance does not violate the First
Amendment. The district court found the City
reasonably relied on other cities' relevant studies in
concluding sexually oriented businesses will produce
undesirable secondary effects in Ramsey, the City
passed the. zoning ordinance to diminish the
unwanted secondary effects, and the ordinance gives
sexually oriented businesses like Holmberg's a
reasonable opportunity to operate in the City. Having
reviewed the record, we conclude these findings are
not clearly erroneous.
We agree with the district court that
Holmberg's case is largely controlled by Renton.
Because the City's zoning ordinance limits the
location of sexually oriented businesses rather than
banning them altogether, the ordinance is analyzed as
a form of time, place, and manner regulation of
protected speech. Id. at 46. Regulations of this kind
withstand First Amendment attack provided the
regulations are content-neutral, are designed to serve
a substantial governmental interest, and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication. Id. at 47. Initially, Holmberg
contends Ramsey's zoning ordinance is not
content-neutral. To decide this issue, we must
consider the City's purpose in passing the ordinance.
Ward v. Rock Against Racisn, 491 U.S. 781, 791,
105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989). If the
City's ordinance serves a purpose unrelated to the
expressive content of the sexually oriented businesses
the City wants to regulate, the ordinance 'degmed
neutral, even though the ordinance may affect those
businesses incidentally. Id. Here, the ordinanie's
stated purpose is to lessen the undesirable seco ndary
effects sexually oriented businesses ,'avye on
surrounding neighborhoods, make these businesses
less accessible to minors, prevent losses in! property
values, and reduce criminal activity. Like the district
court, we find nothing in the ordinance that suggests
the City Council passed the ordinance to suppress the
message of Holmberg's sexual materials, rather than
to limit the choice of locations for businesses, like
his. Thus, the ordinance, justified withot reference
to the content of the regulated ,speec4,, is
coitent-neutral., Id.
Notwithstanding the ordinance's clearly ,st ted
purpose, Holmberg contends the circumstances that
led to the enactment of the zoning ordinanqq §how
the City's concern with secondary effects is a pretext
masking the City's real purpose to ceppr his
sexually oriented business's protected speech.
Holmberg's cointention flies in the face of the district
coirt's fin dings. See 800 F. Supp. at 821-23.
Fortified by compelling support in the repo-4, the
district court's finding that the City Coun .,,passed
the zoning ordinance to diminish sexually oriented
businesses" secondary effects "is more thaq adequate
to establish that the City pursuit of its zoning
interests here was unielated to the. suppression of
free expression." Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
Next, Holmberg contends the Cit laiJed to
establish that its ordinance serves 4 utantial
governmental interest. Holmberg argues the, City
cannot support its claim that sexuaUy oiented
businesses cause undesirable secondayO effects
because the City produced no evidence that his
business increased crime, lowered property values,
or jeopardized minors' well-being. We agree with
Holmberg that it is not enoigh for the City merely to
give lip service to a legitimate governmental interest.
The City also has the burden to substantiate its
declaration' that zoning regulations are needed to
curb unwanted secondary effects of sexually oriented
businesses that operate in Ramsey. Sqe Cornerstone
Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 9487.2d 464, 469
(8th Cir. 1991). Although a city can establish its
substantial'interest by showing that sexually oriented
businesses are actually causing secondary effetts, see
SDJ, Inc. v. City oflHouston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1274
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989),
a city can also satisfy its burden by coniiling a
record of other cities' experiences with sexually
oriented businesses that the city rea§oiably, blieves
to be relevant to the city's problem, see ij iting
Renton, 475 U.S. 'at 50-52); International Fod &
Beverage Sys. v.,City of Fort).avderdate,)794 F.2d
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1520, '126-27 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, the City
passed its .toning ordinance relying on other cities'
studies showing that sexually oriented businesses
have "'an adverse impact on surrounding
neightiith ods. Because the City reasonaoly believed
the studits were relevant to the problems in Ramsey,
the 6ty satisfied its burden. See Renton, 475 U.S.
at 5152.
In a related argument, Holmberg contends the
faci4 otiie l"ordinance "plainly refletts an intent to
censor on" the basis of content, rather than [a]
condbrn over secondary effects" because the
ordi9ce trdats his nonconforming sekually oriented
business differently from other nonconforming uses
in the city. Holmberg points out coirectiy that the
ordinance. permits nonconforming uses that do not
deal li'sexially explicit materials to remain in their
current bocations until the City produces
"documented studies and evidence" showing adverse
secondy 6ffcts. Conversely, Hnlmberg contends
the ordm late mandates that his- nonconforming
bus ies# mut relocate without requiring the City to
make ai ar showing. Holmberg's argument that
the or4ha& relieves the City of the burden t6'
establish Ik substantial interest in the ordinance's
provisinaijeting the secondary effects of sexually
oriented budiesses is legally frivolous. In our view,i
Holmberg simply ignores the district court's fiidings
that the'City enacted the ordinance on the stiength'of
thorougli'I isearch, public heanrigs, documented
studies, and considered deliberations, and stubbbrnly
argues the City must document its substantial interest
with lodalized studies and evidence showing that
secondaiy 'ffects actually exist. Under the First
Amendaemnt, the City was not required "to conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already. ten&iated by other cities" before enacting an
ordinance that lessens sexually oriented businesses'
secondary effiects. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51. When the
ordinaneb was !passed, the City Council had reliable
evidence, before it that businesses like Holmberg's
produce 'undesirable side effects. Thus, the
ordinande's provisions requiring Holmberg to
relocate Irii business represented a legitimate
governmental response to a substantial interest, not
content-bhsed regulation.
Holmberg also contends the ordinance denies
him a reasonable opportunity to operate a sexually
oriented business in Ramsey. Under the ordinance,
sexually oriented businesses have access to 35% of
the City's latnd zoned for commercial uses, which
includes both developed and undeveloped land.
Much of ie available land is located alorg major
streets 'th at. ittersect Highway 10 and, like
Holmbei .kburrent location, the land is within sight
o the Wa. Nevertheless, Holmberg contends
to st -o relocating on 'this land effectively puts
him Out of business. The First Amendtpent is not,
violated,' 4owever,. merely because Holmberg must-,
"fend for'rhipiselfJ i the real estate Warket, ongs!
equal footing with Pther propective purchspers and.
lessees" 'Id. at 54. We agree with the district court
that the land available to Holmberg under -the
ordinance ,puts him on equal footing with other
businesses considering locating in.Ramsey. See 800
F. Supp. at 822-23,. Because the ordinance provide;.
Holmberg with potential relocation sites in accessibleo
commercially zoned areas, we conclude the
ordinance does not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues ofoommunication. See Alexander v. City of
Minneapolis, 9281F:2d'278, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1991)..
Additionally,, Holmberg contends the
ordinancegives the City unbridled discretion to deny
his requests to' spibdivide a larger tract of land and
construct a building for his business. on one of the
smaller lots., Because Holmberg would use the
subdivided ,land for a sexually oriented business,
Holmberg telli els the planning commission and City
Council would deny his.subdivision requests based
on lainguage in the ordinance permitting them to
consider "the best use of the land." The City
strenuously disagrees. As the City reads the
ordinance, sexually oriented businesses can locate
anywhere within the authorized commercial.zones,
provided the location is at least 1000 feet from the
protected uses. The City thus concedes that.it could.
not use the challenged language to deny Holmberg's
request to subdivide, a larger tract of land because
Holmberg would relocate his sexually oriented
business on the subdivided land. We conclude the
City's interpretation alleviates Holmberg's concern.
See Ward 49 1, .S. at 795-96.
Finally, Holmberg contends the ordinance
violates his equal protection rights because it treats
sexually oriented businesses differently than other
noncopforming uses that do not deal in sexually
oriented materials. Holmberg bases his contention on
the same reasons he advances in support of his First
Amendment challenge. We believe our earlier
discussion rejecting Holmberg's First Amendment
challenge 'also forecloses Holmberg's equal
protection contention. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 55
n.4.
In our view, Ramsey's zoning ordinance is
content-neutral, the City has shown the existercue of
a substantial governmeAital interest to suppozr its
ordinance, and the ordinance is narrow!y-';Iored to
achieve the City's. substant!iJ interest. The zoning
ordinance utilizes separation restrio: ', to
accomplish the City's Stated go'al'of protct P tIh
quality of life in the community, while at the same
time makes some ardas of the City availabe o
sexually orietd businesses and their patror's. Ia
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sum, Ramsey's zoning ordinance comes to grips with
undesirable secondary effects of sexually oriented
businesses in a way that satisfies the requirements of
the'- rt and Fourteenth Amepndmepts. Having
carefully considered all of Holmberg's contentions,
we affirm the district court.
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